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"WHATEVER HAPPENED'; TO' MARY 'BETH
TINKER"l AND OTHER ,SAGAS IN THE;
ACADEMIC "MARKETPLACE, OF IDEAS';,2
, • ,;r.HOMAS c. FisC;;HER*
• Professor of Law, New England School of Law. A.B. University of Cincinnati,
1960; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1966. All; rights reserved.
1. The theme of this paper is taken from a well known American case decided by
the Supreme Court in 1969, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969). I am very grateful to the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the
University of London, and its Director, Terrance A. Daintith, for providing me with the
incentive, a talk to Fellows of the Institute in March, 1991, that resulted in this paper. I
also thank my Dean, John F. O'Brien, and Board of Trustees for giving me the freedom
to affiliat~ with the Institute, and the Universities of Cambridge, Exeter, and Edinburgh
during 1991. I am especially grateful to a former research associate of mine, Peter
Farber, and to 'my current associate, Ric Goodwill, for their many contributions to the
finished article. Finally, I thank Pam Critchfield of Golden Gate for her technical
assistance.
2. The concept that ideas should compete for ,acceptance in the public
"marketplace" did not originate in America or in the U.S. Supreme Court. See
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576, n.3. The idea was first expressed
in Supreme Court jurisprudence by the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in a
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Justice Holmes
wrote that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought'to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." [d. at 630. The concept was first applied to the field of.
education by a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): "[The education of] the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes." [d. at 637. "To believe that patriotism will not
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead' of ... compulsory
... is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds."
[d. at 641.
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of
its substance is the right to differ as to things that, touch the
heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed starin our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty;'
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion ....
[d. at 642.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1969, with Holmesian flourish, Justice ·Abe Fortas declared the rights of students and teachers in the academy: "[I]t
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse
gate,"S he wrote. That seemed a logical proposition; one that'
would stand the test of time. But there was a caveat that, by
now, has nearly swallowed the rule: these freedoms were gainsafed only as long as their exercise did not "materially and substantially interfere"· with the educational mission or disciplinary
processes of the school. Justices Harlan and Black dissented in
Tinker, suggesting that students attend school to learn, not to
teach constitutional values. Today, their dissent seems grimly
prophetic.
The case that is the uniform point of reference for this arti~
cle is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District. It began in late December, 1965, when Mary Beth
Tinker, age 13, her brother John 15, and 16-year-old Chris Eckhardt wore black armbands to their school to evidence opposition to the war in Vietnam. ~ School officials were forewarned of
the students' plan, and hastily adopted a policy under which any
student wearing a black armband would be suspended from
school until the armband was removed. When Mary Beth, John
and Chris appeared, at school wearing armbands, they were
promptly suspended for violating this school policy.
The students' challenge to the policy reached the Supreme
Court in late 1968. 6 In February, 1969, the Court provided the
constitutional framework for student exercise of First Amendment rights within a public secondary school.'
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
4. Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, ,749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
5. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
6. The Tinker Court did not address the issue of "prior restraint," since the petitioners sought an injunction preventing the school authorities from. disciplining those
who had worn the armbands. Prior restraint has become more of an issue in post- Tinker
cases in which school regulations have been challenged on their face. Courts in prior
restraint cases have to assess the reasonableness of a school official's estimate of the
likelihood of a disruption in the less-exacting light of the Tinker "fore~ast" rule.
7. With Justice Abe Fortas writing for a 7-2 majority, the Court declared that "First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
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Justice Fortas characterized the wearing of armbands as
"akin to 'pure speech' "8 and found that "in order for the State
ment, are available to teachers and ·students." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
8. [d. at 505. I have never fully grasped the legal significance, if any, of the term or
activity of "pure speech" as applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Constitutional analysis. In the twenty-five or so Supreme Court decisions that use that term, no clear definition is given, although several could be inferred. A common use, and the one used in the"
.first case to incorporate the term, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), is to distinguish
"pure speech" from the communication of ideas by "conduct:" "We emphatically reject
the notion ... that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct ... as these amendments afford
to th~se who communicate ideas by pure speech." [d. at 555. Hence, it was my belief that
"pure speech" referred to communication that was essentially visual, a sign or symbol,
such as the black armband in Tinker, which the Court called "akin to pure speech," but
also "symbolic speech." In this sense, the "speech" relied very little on verbalization or
action, or, if published, consisted of very few words. Thus, its content was in the eyes
(and mind) of the beholder. The "speech" was "pure" because it was largely unaffected
by intimidation, haranguing, disruptive behavior, and so forth, which often blur the line
between Constitutionally-protected expression and unprotected "acts," a distinction
often made in the Supreme Court's Constitutional analysis. In the oft-cited Cox case,
"pure speech" is distinguished from "conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing
on streets and highways." [d. at 555.
The same distinction appeared in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967) regarding a parade ordinance, and in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969). Apparently, the practice of Native American junior high school students
wearing their hair in the style of Plains Indians was, like the armband in Tinker, "akin
to pure speech," although in New Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097 (1974) it was
labeled "symbolic speech." [d. at 1099. Nude dancing, however, was alleged to involve
"expressive acts as distinct from pure speech or representation . . . . " Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). Souter approved of the
analysis employed in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), wherein conduct was
contrasted with speech in the protest-burning of a draft card. In O'Brien the term "pure
speech" was not only not used .. but the protagonist's allegation that his act of defiance
was "protected 'symbolic speech' " appears to have been rejected by the Court majority.
[d. at 376. This seems at odds with the definition of "pure speech" as purely visual,
which the burning of a draft card, or flag, clearly is. However, the Court was disposed in
O'Brien to focus on a prohibited act - the destruction of government property - and
not on the acts' communicative content. In a later case, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974), the Court stated that, "O'Brien's activity involved 'conduct' rather than pure
'speech.''' [d. at 411. If the "visual aid" definition were correct, one would also expect
"pure speech" to be mentioned in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which Cohen walked through a court-house corridor wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the
Draft" emblazoned on the back. A verbal message to be sure, but communicated in a
chiefly visual way. See id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, of the three cases most
likely to use "pure speech" in the visual sense (O'Brien, Tinker and Cohen) only Tinker
uses the term at all.
Other cases lending reinforcement to this view of "pure speech" are: Linmark Assoc.
v. Willingboro 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
558 (1980) (which speaks of the "transcendental constitutional value [of] pure speech").
This is as much of a definition as any Supreme Court case provides. Justice Marshall
apparently would label as "pure speech" a student address to a compulsory high school
assembly. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 690 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 2

354

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:351

in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show [or 'forecast']
that ... engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school .... "9
This so-called "Tinker test," used to determine when school
authorities can constitutionally interfere with student freespeech rights, was derived from two cases decided by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals three years earlier: Burnside u. Byars lO
However, Supreme Court jurisprudence appears to allow two other definitions of the
term "pure speech," neither of which fit my understanding and theory, or the Tinker
analysis. I do not reject either of them, but the second would vastly expand the way in
which that term has normally been used by the Court.
The first alternative definition of "pure speech" is "Speech or Debate in either
House [of Congress]." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The context in which this phrase is
cited in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (the Pentagon Papers case)
suggests that "pure speech" is synonymous with "political speech." Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), also uses the term in the Gravel manner. Yet, Gravel
seems more clearly to reference Congress in debate, as opposed to Senator Proxmire's
unofficial "Golden Fleece" award. [d. at 126.
Another line of cases seems to define "pure speech" as the type of "political speech"
the first amendment was quintessentially meant to protect. Namely, "words ... directed
at [or about] public officials and their conduct in office." Gentile v. Nevada, 111 S. Ct.
2720, 2724 (1991). ("There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the
State's power lies at the very center of the First Amendment. Nevada seeks to punish
the dissemination of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct .... "). In
rather clear accord with this view are Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), and
Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975), both involving a federal statute prohibiting
and punishing verbal threats to the President's life.
Hence, it is not clear whether the Tinker majority uses "pure speech" in the sense of
"symbolic," or visual, speech (which has fared rather well in Constitutional jurisprudence), or in the sense of "political speech," which is often limited by some sufficiently
compelling, competing governmental interest. For all its lofty sound, "pure speech" does
not appear to be a significant discriminator in Tinker and related cases.
9. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners
for a silent, passive expression of opinion unaccompanied by
any disorder or disturbance on the part of the petitioners.
There is no evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the school's work or collision with the
rights of other students to be secure and let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.
[d. at 508.
10. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). Students were suspended for wearing "freedom
buttons" in violation of a school policy that prohibited "distracting and annoying conduct." The appellate court found no evidence of disruption and held the regulation to be
arbitrary and capricious and an infringement of student rights of free expression. Unless
speech-related activity by students on school grounds "materially and substantially in-
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and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education.l1 Accepting a priori that the state has a compelling interest in maintaining an orderly educational system, the Fifth Circuit refused
to enjoin enforcement of a school regulation, and held in
Blackwell that students' First Amendment rights can be
abridged by state officials if reasonably necessary to protect
other legitimate state interests. 12 In Burnside, however, where
no disruption was shown, the suppression of student expression
was found to be "arbitrary and capricious" and therefore
unconstitutional.
This foundation having been laid, the Tinker court merely
applied the Burnside-Blackwell test to the facts at hand.
In the last paragraph of his opinion, Justice Fortas rephrased the Burnside standard by inserting the word "forecast,"
thereby extending the reach of Tinker.ls Once the school rule
was challenged, the Court put the burden on the administration
to demonstrate a constitutionally-sufficient justification to regulate student behavior. But, in determining whether school officials are justified in "forecasting" disruption, Tinker requires
only that a court find that their anticipation of potential disorder was not unreasonable.14 It is thus more difficult for a court
to find fault with a school administration when its regulation has
terfere[s) with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school"
said the court, such speech can not be prohibited. [d. at 749.
11. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Under facts similar to Burnside, the Blackwell
court found a "complete breakdown in school discipline" resulted from the manner in
which students displayed their buttons or attempted to get other students to wear them.
[d. at 753. See also Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) .
.12. [d. See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
13. The Tinker dicta requires that the record contain "facts which might reasonably
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities ... or the lives of others." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Hence, school
authorities would have to show actual disruption or some objective prospect thereof.
14. Fortas stated that:
But in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression .... In order for the State in the person of school
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, it must be able to show that its 'action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.
'[d. at 508-509.
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acted as a prior restraint,1I1 and precluded the anticipated disturpance from occurring.
The Tinker court evidently accepted the legal proposition
that high schools and their students might be judged by a lower
constitutional standard than the public in general with regard to
First Amendment rights. In Tinker, the state (school) had only
to demonstrate a "legitimate" interest in regulation, rather than
the "compelling" interest that often must be shown in such circumstances. Not only are students not adults, but a school is not
a street corner.
Justice Stewart, in his concurring OpinIOn, reminded the
Court that the First Amendment rights of children are not coextensive with those adults: "[A] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child like someone in a captive audience - is not possessed of that
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of
First Amendment guarantees. "18
Prior to Tinker, and subsequently as well, the Supreme
Court has frequently noted that states and school officials enjoy
"comprehensive authority" to prescribe and control conduct in
schools, at least when their actions are consistent with the Con.stitution. 17 The student's interest in free expression has to be
balanced against the state's interest in providing an effective
public school system. State officials' latitude in formulating rules
and regulations was limited only by the requirement that they
be reasonably related to the maintenance of order within the
system. The situations in which school officials' actions took a
back seat to students' rights were rare indeed. 18
15. In what is essentially dicta, Fortas addressed the broader question whether a
school regulation imposing a prior restraint could be challenged. on its face, prior to any
violation of that rule. Outside the school environment, however, the Supreme Court has
aggressively opposed regulations that act as "prior restraints." See Near v. Minnesota ex
rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); New
York Times Co.. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
16. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 649·50 (1968».
17. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
18. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
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But it is not for this balancing approach to allocating rights
that Tinker is cited. Rather, it is for Justice Fortas' sweeping
dicta regarding the Constitutional rights of students. "It can
hardly be argued," he wrote, "that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights· to freedom of speech at the
schoolhouse gate."19
The [Bill of Rights] protects the citizen· against
the state itself and all of its creatures - Boards
of Education not excepted .... That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere
platitudes. 20

Hence, from Tinker onward,
[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are
'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must
respect . . . . IIi our system, students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate. They
may not be confined to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved. 21

Is this rather sweeping grant of Constitutional protection to
students workable? Personally, I doubt that a school at any level
could opera,te effectively at the threshold of "material and substantial disruption." Indeed, the dissents of Justices Harlan and
Black in Tinker forcefully assert that position. Black wrote that
"[t]he Court's holding in this case ushers in what I deem to be
an entirely new era in which the power to control pupils by the
elected 'officials of state supported public schools.. .' is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court."22 "[P]ublic
school students [are not] sent to the schools at public expense to
broadcast political or any other views to educate and inform the
public. [T]axpayers send children to school ... to learn, not
19.
20.
(1943)).
21.
22.

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 507 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
Id. at 515.
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teach."23
The twenty-year retreat from the Supreme Court's bold, but
ultimately unworkable, dicta in Tinker is the subject of this article; the better to establish what we have learned in the process.
Who was correct, Fortas or Black? Was the Tinker decision a
"magna carta" for students and teachers, or did it represent
something of a "high water mark" in the expansion of constitutional "rights"24 for both groups, from which the U.S. Supreme
Court has, by-and-Iarge, retreated ever since? The latter, it
seems to me, proved true. I submit that the Tinker "test" was
unworkable from the start and that lower courts, perceiving it to
be so, began a retreat from it, joined eventually by the U.S. Supreme Court, that left the academy profoundly confused and
significantly changed.
II. THE CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
Over twenty years have passed since the Tinker case was
decided. In that time, well over 40 major "education law" cases
have been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court; exclusive of
those dealing with public school integration and public assistance to parochial schools. Cases of the last two types add significantly to that number. In the forty years prior to Tinker, the
Supreme Court decided roughly ten "education law" cases.
The gradual erosion of the sweeping guarantees implied by
the Tinker decision was neither consistent nor uninterrupted.
Generally speaking, however, students and teachers have lost
rights over the past twenty years. In the process, the Supreme
Court has established a iIew Constitutional balance and new legal standards.
First, the school environment has come to be viewed as
unique and somewhat fragile. Second, teachers and administrative officials have been accorded great discretion in managing
23. Id. at 522.
24. It is popular for civil libertarians to talk in terms of legal "rights," and the rightprivilege distinction in U.S. law. See Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961). However, as the rest of the paper will show, the value of a legal "interest" depends very much upon how it is balanced against threats to its enjoyment in the eyes of
a court majority.
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the academy, particularly as regards academic decisionmaking,
and their decisions are accorded the utmost respect 'by courts of
law. Third, public school students are usually "captive audiences" in the school environment, and do not enjoy the full
rights of the public in general. Fourth, students may be entitled
to some "process" to avoid arbitrary and capricious decisions by
state officials, but far less process than is received by others
faced with a similar exercise of state power. Fifth, younger children have fewer rights than older students. Sixth, school officials
have near-absolute and unreviewable control over activities
which are considered part of their curricular or pedagogical
responsibilities.
The year 1969, however, seemed like a propitious time for a
sweeping affirmation of the Constitutional rights of youth, and
the proper functioning of the intellectual marketplace. The public-service legacy of recently-slain President John F. Kennedy
had captured the hearts and minds of many Americans; the
country's horizons seemed unlimited. The most sweeping civil
rights bill in U.S. history had just been passed; education legislation and funding was pyramiding toward the Education
Amendments of 1972;211 youth was finding its voice and feeling
its power, and adults were growing more aware and respectful of
it; and the Vietnam War had yet to deflate American self-confi'dence. In short, the times were economically, politically and legally expansive. Everything seemed possible, given time, money
and political will. Justice Fortas' dicta simply followed suit.
But times did change, and significantly so. The Vietnam
War opened political divisions that grew violent. The overblown
promises of salvation through education failed to produce the
expected return. Recession hit the U.S. economy and it lost hegemony in world markets. We as a people became less enchanted
with liberalism and idealism, and became more fiscally and politically conservative. And so did Supreme Court judgments regarding student and teacher rights.
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, July 2, 1964, especially 42 U.S.C. §§
1971-74 (1988); Pub. L. 92-318, June 23, 1972.
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III. STUDENT AND TEACHER RIGHTS
In cases prior to Tinker, the U.S. Supreme Court established that students, teachers and others had Constitutional
rights in the academic environment/ol6 The majority of those
early cases, however, dealt with the rights of adults or educational institutions.~17 It was not until 1943, in the case of West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, that the rights
of students were squarely addressed by the Court. In Barnette,
Justice Jackson delivered a bold opinion, favoring the right to
free expression in the educational setting. He held that students
may refuse to salute the flag when doing so would conflict with
their religious beliefs.28
In 1967, Keyishian had protected teachers against forced
"loyalty oaths." Pickering, in 1968, gave teachers the same
speech rights that other citizens enjoyed outside the classroom.
These decisions, however, also involved adults, not students. Finally, in 1969, came Tinker.
A thicket has grown up around the dicta of Justice Fortas,
as different federal circuit courts have sought to apply the seemingly simple standard of his brief, flamboyant opinion. Federal
courts have had to adapt the Tinker "forecast" rule to a myriad
of circumstances that arose in the school environment. As a re26. In 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Dartmouth College Case 17 U.S. (4
Wheaton) 518 (1819), in which Chief Justice John Marshall upheld the rights of private
colleges by holding that New Hampshire could not unilaterally modify the charter establishing Dartmouth College. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prevented states from forbidding the teaching of foreign languages to young pupils. Statutes of this sort, stated the
Court, interfere with the liberty rights of parents, students and teachers. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) upheld the right of parochial elementary and secondary schools to offer alternatives to public schooling as a "free exercise" of religion.
27. See Meyer v. 'Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
_
28. "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures - Board of Education not excepted,
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none
that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights." Barnette, 319 U.S. at
637. By the time Tinker was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court had already recognized
teacher's rights of expression. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
(loyalty oaths); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (a teacher's right of free
expression outside of the classroom is equal to other citizens', unless his statements are
reckless, knowingly false and an impediment to school operations).
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suIt, Tinker, as interpreted by lower courts, only faintly resembles Tinker as written.
'The most significant and widely-cited of the post-Tinker
cases are Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education 29 and Shanley
v. Northeast Independent School District. so Both cases dealt
with prior restraint of printed student material,31
Eisner, the
students challenged a school regulation requiring prior approval
of printed or written matter intended for distribution on school
grounds. This regulation provided that no material could be distributed "which, either by its content or by the manner of distribution itself, will interfere with the proper and orderly operation
and discipline of the school, will cause violence or disorder, or
will constitute an invasion of the rights of others."s2 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the school policy failed to
meet the standards established in Freedman v. Maryland,Ss but
rejected the petitioner's argument that Near precluded any
prior review by public officials. Rather, the court held that Near,
read in the light of Times Film Corp. and Freedman, allowed for
prior restraint under appropriate circumstances. The Eisner
court found that the Constitution did not forbid a properlydrawn and applied school regulation, requiring submission of all
material to school authorities before its distribution on
campus. s•

In

29. 440 F.2d 803 (2nd Cir. 1971).
30. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
31. Regulations imposing prior restraints typically involve not spoken or symbolic
speech, but written or printed material that its proponents distribute to a large audience.
The seminal case on this subject is Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931),
in which prior restraints were viewed as presumably unconstitutional. However, in Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), the Court stated for the first time that
prior restraints (on publications and films) are not necessarily unconstitutional under all
circumstances.
32. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 805.
33. 380 U.S. 51 (1965) ,(holding a motion picture censorship statute unconstitutional). The Court held that prior restraint must take place under procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of government censorship. Those safeguards were: (1)
the burden rests with the state to show that the film is unprotected expression; (2) an
administrative decision to bar projection of the film is not final, but serves only to preserve the status quo for a brief, fixed period; during which (3) the procedure must provide for prompt judicial review before final restraint is imposed. See id. at 58-59.
34. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 807-11; ct. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919):
"The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507: "[The]
Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
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The Second Circuit followed the broad co~tours of Tinker,
however, by holding that the school regulation could not be
overbroad or vague. SII The regulation was strengthened by the
fact that it did not authorize punishment, but only required
prior submission, and applied only to students on school property. The policy was defective, however, in that it lacked a procedure and time frame under which the review was to be conducted. s6 Although it referenced the three requirements of
Freedman, the Eisner court did not feel that Freedman had to
be strictly followed in the context of a public secondary school.
Hence, while students were gainsafed certain communicative
rights by Tinker, Eisner might cause them to leave some of
those rights at the school gate. Is not a student, or anyone, likely
to alter his message if he knows it is subject to prior review?
In Shanley, three high school seniors were suspended for
distributing a newspaper of their own creation near, but outside,
school grounds. The Fifth Circuit elected to address the broader
Constitutional issue that is implicit in any attempt by school officials to limit student expression, rather than resolve the narrower issue presented: the power of school officials to reach offcampus student speech. No doubt, the court took its impetus
from the fact that the school board insisted that its policy was
Constitutional on both its face and as applied to the offending
students. Decided just three years after Tinker, Shanley provides a more complete picture of the constitutional parameters
of prior restraint of student speech.
Taking note of the uniqueness of the secondary school setting, the Shanley court asserted the now-familiar need for a constitutional analysis tailored to that situation: "the exercise of
rights of expression in the high schools, whether by students or
by others, is subject to reasonable constraints more restrictive
than those constraints that can normally limit First Amendment
freedoms. "S7 The Tinker court also had recognized that public
schools were special environments, but its "material and subthe States and of school officials ... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."
35. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968).
36. It did not specify what constituted "distribution," nor to whom and how the
material was to be submitted. Neither did the rule prescribe a definite and brief period
within which the review process would be completed. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 810-11.
37. Shanley, 462 F.2d at 969 (emphasis added).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/2

12

Fischer: "Marketplace of Ideas"

"MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS"

1993]

363

stantial disruption" test would not insulate them much from the
hurley-burley of the public "marketplace of ideas." Not so in
Shanley. The Shanley court found nothing unconstitutional per
se about a requirement that students submit materials to the
administration prior to its distribution on school grounds. "As
long as the regulation for prior approval does not operate to stifle the content of any student publication in an unconstitutional
manner and is not unreasonably complex or onerous, the requirement of prior approval would more closely approximate
simply a regulation of speech and not a prior restraint."38
The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, hewed closer to the
Tinker line:
The . . . editorial imputing a 'sick mind' to the
dean reflects a disrespectful and tasteless attitude
toward authority. Yet does that imputation . . .
without more, justify a 'forecast' of substantial
disruption or material interference with the
school policies or invade the rights of others? We
think not . . . . [M]ere expressions of [the students'] feelings with which [school officials] do
not wish to contend is not the showing required
by the Tinker test . . . .39

Whenever the school administration can demonstrate, as
Tinker required, a reasonable cause to believe that the expression would result in material and substantial interference with
legitimate school activities or with the rights of others,40 the
Shanley court se.emed to approve the schools' general oversight
of student communications, so long as there were certain safeguards. These might constitute time, place, or manner regula38. [d.
39. Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir. 1970) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
40.
We do not here delimit the categories of materials for which a
high school administration may exercise a reasonable prior restraint of content to only those materials obscene, libelous, or
inflammatory, for we realize that specific problems will require
individual and specific judgments .... We do conclude, however, that the school board's burden of demonstrating reasonableness becomes geometrically heavier as its decision begins to
focus upon the content of materials that are not obscene,
libelous, or inflammatory.
Shanley, 462 F.2d at 971.
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tions that equitably balance the interests of students and the
school. This is a far cry, however, from the jealous First Amendment protection afforded in Tinker on campus or in the
classroom.
In the end, the Shanley court found two reasons to strike
down the school regulation. First, the rule (as it stood) was overbroad in that it subjected all student written expression to a
prior restraint, without regard to the time, place, and manner of
its distribution. And the regulation contained no standards to
guide the reviewing authority when deciding whether or not to
approve a given student publication for distribution. Second, the
regulation violated students due process rights in that it lacked
any procedure by which they were to submit materials, and it
failed to establish a brief and definite time for review. Finally, it
did not contain any method to appeal the school's decision.
The Eisner and Shanley courts seemed to recognize that
once school boards put appropriate procedures in place, officials
could review and prohibit certain types of student expression
which, in their objective judgment, were likely to disrupt school
affairs.
Of course, these cases dealt with student publications on or
near school grounds. The Tinker principle should have even
more vitality away from school, where the institutional mission
is less likely to be affected. In Thomas v. Board of Education,
Granville Central School District,41 for example, the Second
Circuit ruled that a school board is powerless to punish a student for publishing and distributing an underground newspaper
away from school premises. "When school officials are authorized only to punish speech on school property, the student is
free to speak his mind when the school day ends. In this manner, the community is not deprived of the salutary effects of
. . . . . ".2
expresslOn
Moreover, whereas Tinker leaves the impression that all
non-disruptive (and one· assumes non-illegal) speech is protected, later cases not only provided for review of content, but
41. 607 F.2d 1043 (2nd Cir. 1979).
42. Id. at 1052.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/2

14

Fischer: "Marketplace of Ideas"

1993]

"MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS"

365

also suppression of legal content. In F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,"3 the Supreme Court recognized, once again, a distinction
between the 'First Amendment rights of school children and
adults, but this time in a more public forum.
In Pacifica Foundation, the decisive factor was the 2 p.m.
radio broadcast of George Carlin's "seven dirty words" monologue. According to Judge Newman, concurring in Thomas, "[i]f
the F.C.C. can act to keep indecent language off the afternoon
airwaves, a school can act to keep indecent language from circulating on high school grounds . . . . [T]he First Amendment
gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's
armband, but not Cohen's jacket.""" Admittedly, there were factors in Pacifica that were not present in Thomas, such as the
fact that the airwaves are licensed and heavily regulated, a radio
listener is something of a "captive," a~d such a listener could be
immature and surprised by Carlin's broadcast. Even if the
Pacifica holding is viewed as approving a time, place, and manner regulation, it is more easily applied to children and schools
than it is to adults and other public buildings, such as
courthouses.
In another revealing case, Trachtman v. Anker,45 the student editor of a' school paper was refused permission to conduct
a sex survey because school officials felt that many students
would be psychologically harmed if confronted by the questions
on the survey form. The district court ruled that the school officials' claims of potential emotional damage were unconvincing.
But its judgment was reversed on appeal.
The Second Circuit held that the evenly-balanced trial record established a sufficient basis for the school board's belief
that distribution of the questionnaire would result in harm to
students throughout the school population. The Trachtman
court thus extended Tinker's concern for "invasion of the rights
of others" to psychological harms as well as physical interferences. And who better to identify these hard-to-prove, prospec43. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
44. Thomas, '607 F.2d at 1057. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court
stated that "certain kinds of otherwise permissible speech [need not be] ... tolerated in
certain places." Id. at 19.
45. 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977).
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tive harms than professional educators? Certainly not federal
judges, it seems.
These two Second Circuit decisions indicate the extent to
which Tinker can be enlarged, but also eviscerated, by wellmeaning judges. When Justice Fortas announced the "material
and substantial disruption" test, he surely was not contemplating the effect that indecent language, or a sex questionnaire,
might have on another student. After all, were not students to
develop their citizenship skills in a robust exchange, protected
by the First Amendment right up to the threshold of actual or
imminent disruption?
Thus did the minor caveat of Tinker, rather than its central
theme, accord school officials a powerful weapon; a weapon made
more potent by a great deal of judicially-mandated latitude for
official discretion.
Tinker was the easy case - there simply was no "disorder."
It is not always so simple to discern the prospect or extent of
potential disruption. If a balancing test is to be used, and that is
generally the central issue in Constitutional litigation, will it
favor students (Tinker), school officials (Trachtman), or be totally neutral? Should school authorities be held to a high standard of proof of disruption or potential disruption, or can oncampus expression be entirely prohibited if the reviewer is able
to demonstrate some ground to believe that the exercise of expression would be potentially harmful to some students?

As Tinker's promises grew increasingly dilute, only those
situations that offered no evidence for a reasonable assessment
of potential harm would cause an appellate court to enjoin enforcement of the school board's ban on expression. The posture
of courts today seems to be one of substantial deference to
school authority, and a disinclination to impose a judicial veto
on matters of school discipline where there is any rational basis
for the decisions of the school authorities.
What lies in the future? Certainly, the level of disturbance
that would support an abridgement of student rights has been
judicially lowered since Tinker was decided. There is a danger
that school officials, with near-unbridled discretion to forbid lan-
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guage they regard as inappropriate, may "seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the
expression of unpopular views."46 This is especially true if "indecent" language forms a part of student criticism of school policies or authorities, as is often the case.
If all off-campus publication contains criticism of school of-

ficials, especially if indecent, the prospect of its eventual distribution and impact within the institution increases. If the "indecent language" holdings are grafted onto Tinker, it seems
certain that future courts will find that school officials may prohibit and punish on campus-and perhaps off-campus as
well-any speech or publication that is offensive or threatens
disruption, and probably preview it as well. 47
Of course, the academy has grown into a vastly more complicated (and arguably dangerous) place since Tinker was de~
cided. School children, already maturing more quickly than
might be conducive to "citizenship training," are bombarded
with all sorts of "real life" messages, some of them terribly violent, narcissistic and overtly material. The muted, balanced "citizenship training" of schools, if any, can become completely lost
46. Cohen. 403 U.S. at 26.
47. It is a general. if over-simplified. principle of Constitutional analysis that the
victory of one position or party over another often depends upon the Constitutional
"test" used by the court. Thus, an exacting test can create a burden for the defending
party so great that it is virtually impossible to meet, or it can be so modest that it is
easily met. As a general rule, state interference with a "fundamental right" (such as the
first amendment rights of free speech and press) invites "strict scrutiny" from the court,
which means the regulation is presumably illegal, and is very difficult for the state to
justify, unless the state has a "compelling" reason for its action. Near v. Minnesota ex
rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). A mid-level of court scrutiny is reserved for the protection of "important" rights which the state must have a "substantial" justification in order to regulate. This degree of scrutiny is more common to equal protection cases, for
example involving sex discrimination, than to first amendment cases. See Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976). The least searching degree of scrutiny in Constitutional analysis is
"rational basis." It is the standard generally applied to the states~ "health and welfare"
regulations. They are presumably valid if the state can show a "reasonable basis" for the
regulation. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). "Time, place and
manner" regulations, since they neither prohibit nor punish speech and press altogether,
but simply regulate it in a content-neutral way, are normally given this lowest degree of
scrutiny: Are they reasonable? However, outright bans of speech and press, or regulation
based on the content of the message, is generally subjected to "strict scrutiny."
It is instructive, therefore, in terms of the "value" placed on student speech and
press, that Tinker applied the mid-range Constitutional test of "substantial" basis, and
not the higher, "compelling" governmental interest test. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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in the process, particularly if it receives no reinforcement
outside the school environment. Conversely, secondary school
students may simply be making a plea for adult guidance, testing authority simply to establish limits and boundaries that society sometimes seems to lack and that may no longer be provided
at home.
In the twenty years since Tinker, other Justices ascended
the high bench; Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger, appeared less eager than
Justices Fortas, Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, and Chief Justice Warren, to recognize and extend civil liberties, and would
even support curtailing student rights. 48 Hence, schools have
regained some of their authority, but at the expense of both
teachers and students, especially minor students.
Just one example of this is the refusal of the U.S. Supreme
Court to extend Constitutional rights to students and teachers
at private schools under the rubric of "public function" or "coventuring. "
IV. THE DEMISE
DOCTRINE

OF

THE

"PUBLIC

FUNCTION"

Many legal analysts expected, indeed probably hoped,49 that
a legal theory known as the "public function" doctrine llO might
be used to extend Constitutional guarantees to students and
48. This contraction of "rights" was evident elsewhere, in cases involving school integration and job discrimination, for example. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (1), 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); cf. Freeman
v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); cf. Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
49. See Robert M. O'Neil, Priuate Uniuersities and Public Law, 19 BUFF. L. REV.
155 (1969-70); THOMAS C. FISCHER, The Decline and Fall of an Artificial Distinction, in
HIGHER EDUCATION: THE LAW AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, pp. 27-39,
(D.P. Young ed., 1971).
50. Portions of the U.S. Constitution, and particularly the bill of rights, protect individuals from over-regulation by government, often called "state action." The term
"public function" refers to certain activities, the performance of which are "traditionally
associated with sovereign governments, and which are operated almost exclusively by
government entities." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457
(4th ed. 1991). The argument is made that whenever a priuate entity undertakes these
"public functions," that individual or entity ought to be subject to the same Constitutional limitations as would be imposed upon the state, if it were the "actor." See id.
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teachers at private schools. After all, this theory was used to extend free speech rights to persons in a privately operated "company town."61 Marsh, the case that gave the "public function"
approach its original vitality, challenged the restrictions enforced in a small town in Alabama by its private corporateowner. Agents of the corporation had posted notices in th~
town's stores prohibiting vending and solicitation without written permission. A Jehovah's Witness claimed that the rule could
not be constitutionally-applied to her distribution of religious
literature. The Supreme Court balanced the property rights of
the corporate owner against the free press and religion rights of
the complainant, and held that the latter occupied a "preferred
position."62 The Court found that the "'business block' serve[d]
as the community shopping center and is freely accessible [to
everyone] .... The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitution[] .... " 63 Thus,
it came to be thought that private actors that conducted "public" functions, like schooling, might be brought under the constraints of the Constitution.
A slightly different legal approach was adopted, but to a
similar end, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,64 this
time to guarantee black citizens equal access to a "private" restaurant. The restaurant leased a portion of a government-financed parking structure through an agreement with the city
parking authority. The Supreme Court found that a mutuallybeneficial ("symbiotic") relationship existed between the government operators of the 'garage and the restaurant, such that the
discriminatory acts of the restaurant were not immunized from
constitutional restraints as being wholly private. 66 The notion
seemed to be that, where government and private actors co-ventured, "state action" might be found. 66
51. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
52. [d. at 509.
53. [d. at 508.
54. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
55. See id. at 723-26. "[T]he commercially leased areas were not surplus state property, but constituted a physically and financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part
of the State's plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit." [d. at 723-24.
56. State action has been defined as "state participation through any arrangement,
management, funds or property." Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1,4 (1958). This definition is
probably too general and sweeping for today's Supreme Court jurisprudence. See
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Both the Marsh and Burton decisions contributed to the legal notion that all schools (public and private) were either so
infused with public interest or received support from the government that they should be equally subject to Constitutional restraints. Are not schools the best environment in which to inculcate democratic values and respect for the rule of law? Are they
not the places we expect to promote unfettered inquiry to produce better citizens?
The theory is an inviting one, and was quite possibly the
best way the Court had in 1961 to reach the discriminatory behavior it sought to prevent. Today, the government either uses
its Interstate Commerce power67 or attaches conditions to the
offer or grant of a variety of public support to private schools. 68
However, due to its enormous potential, the "public function"
theory lived on in the hopes of school rights activists until it was
conclusively settled in the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court case,
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn. 69
In truth, these "state action" or "public function" victories
involved a matter of degree from the beginning.60 Clearly, the
government's right to regulate "private" behavior could only go
so far before it interfered with other "rights," also protected by
the Constitution. This was so even when a "public function" was
performed, or the state had a hand in regulating the private action; perhaps even a considerable hand in doing SO.61
It was a group of cases decided in the early 1970's, some-

times referred to as the "shopping center" cases, that most severely eroded the "public function" doctrine and foretold its
eventual demise in Rendell-Baker.
The first of the shopping center cases, Amalgamated Food
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) infra note 59 and related text.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1988).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988). See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
59. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
60. It depends upon a "degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn." Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
61. See Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967); ct. Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,62 followed the Marsh
"public function" precedent63 by allowing peaceful union picketers to exercise their First Amendment rights in the pick-up area
of a non-union supermarket in a private shopping center near
Altoona, Pennsylvania. 6• The second of the cases, however, took
a more restrictive view.

In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,6r> the U.S. Supreme Court held, in
a five to four decision, that the orderly hand-billing of draft and
war protestors could be excluded from the public areas of a privately-owned shopping center. Although generally open to the
public, these areas were not so "dedicated" to public use as to
permit handbilling unrelated to the shopping center's operations, held the Court majority.66 Justice Marshall, who wrote the
majority opinion in Logan Valley, clung to his previous view regarding public function, and was joined by Justices Brennan,
Douglas and Stewart in dissent. The "public function" theory
was clearly· losing ground, even as the size of the shopping centers increased. 67
The final case, Hudgens v. NLRB,68 flatly reversed Logan
Valley and adopted the anti-"public function" First Amendment posture of Lloyd Corp.69 This time, only two Justices
(Marshall and Brennan) dissented. 70
The rule emerging from the shopping center cases was applied to the field of education in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that a disgruntled vocational counselor and teachers at a private special-needs school
could be dismissed by its director without violating their First
(free speech) and Fourteenth (due process) Amendment rights.
This was so notwithstanding the fact that the school performed
62. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
63. [d. at 316-19.
64. [d. at 324-25.
65. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
66. [d. at 568-70.
67. See id. at 571-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
69. [d. at 518-21.
70. See id. at 525-43. Note, however, that the free speech rights the dissenters argued for under the U.S. Constitution, have been found to exist, in limited and specific
situations, in state constitutions. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83 (1983).
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a statutorily-mandated "public function," and relied on public
funds for at least ninety percent of its operating budget. Apparently, the "public function" theory has lost all of its former
force, and the public/private co-venturing approach rises to the
level of "state action"71 only if the private action was "compelled
or ... influenced by [the state]."72 At least this is so unless
some other federal legislation regulates private conduct. 73
Occasionally, there arises a factual circumstance in which
"the state has so insinuated itself with the ... [private actor] as
to be considered a joint participant in the offending actions."74
One such situation arose in the discipline of students at a private school for maladjusted youths, because the state had involuntarily placed most of them there. Cases of this sort are increasingly rare.
Thus did Rendell-Baker expunge the final ray of hope that
"public function" analysis could be used to leverage civil rights
into private schools, even those that owed their very existence to
government. Indeed, the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement
on this subject strikes a judicious balance between individual
and governmental interests in a state-operated, "nonpublic fo- .
rum" (a po~t authority air terminal): In International Society
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,75 the Society's adherents were
allowed to proselytize in the general public interior areas of air
71. To support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit, the dismissal had to have been
made "under color of law." "[O]ur holdings have made clear that the relevant question is
not simply whether a private group is serving a 'public function.' We have held that the
question is whether the function performed has been 'traditionally the exclusiue prerogative of the State.''' That a private entity performs a function which serves the public
does not make this act state action. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (citing Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974».
72. [d. at 841. "The school ... is not fundamentally different from many private
corporations whose business depends primarily on [government) contracts ... ." [d. at
840-41.
73. [d. at 837-38.
74. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 940 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961». In Milonas, the allegedly "private" actions
were the disciplining of students, many of whom were involuntarily placed in the school's
care by juvenile courts and other state agencies, pursuant to "detailed contracts," and
under "extensive state regulation." Thus, there was a sufficiently close nexus between
the state's sending boys to the school, and the conduct of the school authorities, so that
it was taken "under color of law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Cf, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
75. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
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terminals, but not to solicit funds. This was so because the facility was "dedicated" to another function than communication,
and thus "limitations on expressive activity . . . need only be
reasonable to survive."76 If that is so, then the same standard
would doubtless apply to public schools; likewise "dedicated" to
a specialized public function (education).
One last thing might be said before closing this section on
the application of individual rights and guarantees to private
schools, and that is that the government can regulate private undertakings (including schools), and has, under its Interstate
Commerce power,77 or as a condition to a grant of government
largesse. 78 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an example
of the former approach.79 Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972,80 the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975,81 and the conditions attached to federal guarantees
of student loans are examples of the latter.82 However, these obligations apply to private schools only if they are drawn within
the terms of the legislation, or if schools accept the public funding offered. The rights conferred on individuals are limited to
the express terms of the act, so that many schools, teachers, students and activities may be left uncovered in the private sector,
unlike 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which covers every civil rights violation
"under color" of law, federal, state and local.
V.

ACCESS TO
MESSAGES

INFORMATION/STATE-CONTROLLED

Passing beyond those cases in which "state action" is garbled or lacking, we address a long line of cases in which the "actor" is a public school board, official or teacher, as in Tinker. In
these cases (the remainder of this article addresses mostly this
type), the issue is not whether the Constitution applies, but
76. [d. at 2702 (emphasis added).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
78. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); Board of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988).
80. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (1988).
82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1088-1099 (1988), especially § 1094. See also, e.g., B. Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act After Ten Years of Enforcement: The Past and the
Future, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 845.
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rather to what degree an individual's interest is protected
against a competing state interest. 8s Thus, most of these cases
pit the interest of the state in an educated, responsible and productive citizenry against an individual's right to act as he or she
chooses, even if that behavior limits or thwarts the state's design. Obviously, there is some merit to both sides of the argument, and courts are drawn into the dispute as neutral "referees" and line-drawers. The line drawn between the two
competing interests makes all the difference, of course, and, as
we have seen, the line is not always drawn predictably. Moreover, a divided court will often offer some support to both sides
of the argument, giving each hope for the future, regardless of
where the line is drawn.in the instant case.
The tension between these competing "rights" and interests
is amply illustrated by a modest, but important, group of cases
that I refer to as the "book-burning" cases. 8 • The conflict in
these cases takes essentially two forms. The school may decide
that, for moral or pedagogical reasons, certain materials do not
belong, or that certain lessons ought not to be taught, in the
school environment. Hence, they seek to remove or restrict
them. Alternatively, either students or their parents object to
school materials or lessons and seek to alter or eliminate them. 811
The best example to date in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence is Board of Education v. Pico,88 involving the question
whether the school board has the authority to remove certain
books from the school library. The Supreme Court first gave a
nod in the direction of the school's prerogative, stating that "local school boards have broad discretion in the management of
school affairs . . . . " Then it recognized the competing Constitutional rights of students, parents and teachers, stating that
"[this discretion] must be exercised in a manner that comports
83. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), for example, the "free exercise" (of
religion) rights of the Amish to educate their children as they thought best were pitted
against the state policy of compulsory secondary school education.
84. These cases bear no resemblance to Ray Bradbury's FARENHEIT 451.
85. N. Lichtenstein, Children, the Schools, and the Right to Know: Some Thoughts
at the Schoolhouse Gate, 19 U.S.F. L.REV. 91 (1985); M. Yudof, Library Book S.election
and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527 (1984);
T. van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Government Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197 (1983).
86. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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with the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment."87
In the end, the Court remanded the case for a trial on the merits, after suggesting a "formula" by which to judge whether the
removal of books from a school library was Constitutional or
not: "[If the school board] intend[s] by their removal decision to
deny ... access to ideas with which [persons] disagree[], and if
this intent [is] the decisive factor in the ... decision, then [the
school board has] exercised [its] discretion in violation of the
Constitution. "88 Thus, the apparent arbiter of constitutionality
is whether the school board's action is directed at removing from
student purview information already nominally judged suitable
and available. Public attention is far more focused on an act of
removal, and therefore the "intent" behind it, than it would be
on the more common act of selecting books for the library collection (or designing curriculum) in the first place. If restraint is to
be exercised, arguably the latter situations are the places to exercise it. Removal of the offending books might be accomplished
in the ordinary course of "culling" the collection, and not at the
behest of some bowdlerizing board member or parent. 89
In Grove v. Mead School, a Ninth Circuit case, a parent
complained that the school board's refusal to remove a book
from a curricular reading assignment violated both his child's
right to "free exercise" of religion and the constitutional prohibition against the state's "establishment" of religion, contained
in the First Amendment. 9o The line between a school system's
traditional role in inculcating morals and social responsibility in
students and the promotion of partisan Christian religiosity is,
indeed, a fine one;91 but it is one that has favored the generallybenign judgment of school officials in all but the most extreme
cases. 92
A much more subtle case, however, is now seeking Supreme
87. Id. at 863-64.
88. Id. at 871.
89. Pica, 457 U.S. at 861-62 and 870-71; see also Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d
1528 (9th Cir. 1985).
90. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d at 1533-34.
91. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) society's legitimate interest in general public education was forced to give way to the peculiarities of a well-established
religion (Amish).
92. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980).
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Court review. 93 In that case, the school itself objected to a fifthgrade teacher's keeping a copy of the Bible and other religious
books on his cluttered desk, and reading it silently during periods set aside for individual activity.
A similar restriction on the free flow of information was applied to teachers in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Assn. 94 Rival teacher unions squabbled over access
rights to an intraschool mail system and teacher mailboxes, as a
representation election approached. One union was given exclusive access rights to the system by virtue of its existing collective-bargaining agreement, while the other union challenged that
agreement as violative of its First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The Supreme Court found no such violation, holding that
"[t]he differential access provided [to the mail system and mailboxes was] reasonable because it was wholly consistent with [the
school] District's legitimate interest in "preserving [school]
property ... for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated".9G
"Nowhere have we suggested," said the Court, "that students,
teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to
use all parts of a school building or its immediate environs for
. unlimited purposes."96
That may be true, for a public school is not as freely accessible as, say, a public park or sidewalk. Nevertheless, did not the
Supreme Court say in Tinker that rights were to be preserved
unless their exercise was "materially and substantively [disruptive]"? The mailboxes undoubtedly served as a conduit for important "political" information, useful to the teachers in making
important political choices. Allowing equal access to them is, at
best, a minor inconvenience to school operations. Notwithstanding, the balance was struck in favor of school prerogatives and
comfort, not the limits of the Constitutional rights enshrined in
Tinker.
93. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), ce~t. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992).
94. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
95. [d. at 50. Obviously, schools are "dedicated" principally to the process of learning. But that ought to include communications with and between teachers about the
terms of their employment contract.
96. [d. at 44 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 194, 117-18 (1972».
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In Bethel School District v. Fraser,97 the Supreme Court
took a quantum leap forward in its protectionist jurisprudence,
ostensibly shielding minors from offensive, rather than obscene,
speech.98 In Bethel, Tinker's protections were not extended to a
student who gave to a high school assembly a speech that contained thinly-veiled sexual references. 99 The Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment did not protect Fraser's suggestive speech, nor prevent the School District from disciplining .
him. The Court distinguished Tinker, stating that Fraser's
speech was "unrelated to any political viewpoint,"I00 although it
was made in the context of a student election camp~ign.
It would have made more sense if the Court had fastened
upon the "captive and immature" audience, or the potential for
"disruption," to justify the school's restriction. 101 However, the
facts of Bethel would not seem to make out a better case for the
latter than would the facts of Tinker. Hence, the Court majority
stated simply: "The First Amendment does not prevent the
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and
lewd speech ... would undermine the school's basic educational
mission. "102 That may be true, but where was there any proof of
this prospect? Is it possible that school authorities overreacted
to innocent, if immature, "acting out," simply to keep the academy non-controversial (and bland)?
97. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
98. Cf, Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978) both of which could easily be justified as time, place and manner regulations, not outright prohibitions. There are other factual peculiarities, as well, that distinguish these cases from the circumstances and dicta of Tinker.
99. With nearly 600 fellow students in attendance, Matthew Fraser delivered a
speech nominating another student for student elective office:
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's
firm in his shirt, his character is firm - but most . . . of all,
his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it
in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He
doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and
pushing until finally - he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each and everyone of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B.
vice president - he'll never come between you and the best
our high school can be.
478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
100. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685.
101. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749-50.
102. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685.
.
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Thus, the Supreme Court drew the line, once again, in favor
of school authorities, giving them the power to regulate student
behavior on "moral" grounds, although the innuendo the speech
contained was probably common in discourse among teenage
students, and (depending upon which Justice you believe) there
was no disruption.
This case epitomizes the choice confronting the Court after
Tinker; restoring the compromised authority of school administrators, or protecting students' and teachers' new-found liberties. As we are learning, the line redrawing almost universally
favored the school.
There is yet another "free· communication" issue of the
Bethel sort that has recently bedeviled schools, and that is socalled "hate speech".I03 The U.S. Supreme Court confronted its
first "hate speech" case in its 1991-1992 term, R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paul, Minnesota, but not in the educational setting. lo4 The
problem of regulating such speech in the public marketplace is
different, of course, from its regulation in schools, where "socialization" is one of the "lessons" taught. But that should not be
achieved at the expense of personal opinions and individualism.
This is not the first time the Supreme Court has addressed
purposefully anti-social speech and acts, of course. In two recent
well-known cases, the Court held that there is a potential speech
interest to protect in the burning of a draft card/oil or our nation's flag. loa They have held that there should be similar protec~
tion for anti-social expressions of "viewpoint," as in R.A. V., unless it is shown that the action or response thereto presents a
threat to the public that government has a right to regulate at
103. This usually takes the form of shouted slogans or graffiti, but sometimes appears in legitimate student newspapers (e.g. the Dartmouth Review) as a statement of
opinion or belief. Generally, the message is intentionally and overtly hostile to some segment of the school population, and purposely demeans and vilifies it, often with the
intent, and result, of causing hostile, and equally-caustic reaction. Hate speech is antisocial in both form and intent, but otherwise a legitimate (and generally protected) form
of political expression. The disruption it causes, or is likely to cause, is entirely different,
and can be dealt with under Tinker's caveat.
104. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
105. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
106. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct.
2404 (1990).
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the expense of the speaker's "liberty."lo7 Such circumstances are
not easy to demonstrate. This is so even if the speaker or actor
is deliberately provocative; like a neo-Nazi march through a
predominantly Jewish neighborhood. lOB
Although the Supreme Court declined to hold the St. Paul
"hate speech" ordinance "overbroad,"lo9 it had no difficulty
finding the ordinance "facially unconstitutional."l1o This was so
despite the construction the Minnesota Supreme Court gave the
statute,lll limiting it to "fighting words."ll2 That construction,
far from giving the government the authority to punish the polarizing effects of "hate speech," shrank its authority to those
situations in which it would have a clear right to proscribe or
punish otherwise protected speech or acts not because of their
content, but on the legal grounds of trespass, assault, property
damage and so forth. Thus, the peculiar class of speech that the
statute was passed to address, "hate speech," may continue unpunished (except in the more extreme forms noted) until and
unless it is perceived to have a greater negative social impact
than now appears to be the case, or the speech is given lower
"value" in the hierarchy of Constitutional protection. 1l3
In the public sphere, then, we are left with Justice Brandeis'
formulation of some years ago: "If there be time ... to avert the
evil [of falsehood] by the proce~s of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency
can justify repression. "114 This solution does not appear to be
107. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. In the O'Brien case, such an interest was found. It
was the government's interest in the maintenance of an orderly selective service system.
In other cases, reason could be found if the speech or act (or more often reaction to it)
threatens to "[incite] imminent lawless action," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969), or the speaker's acts constitute "fighting words," that is, they have a "direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom [they are] ... addressed."
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
108. In the mid-1970's, a neo-Nazi group sought to march through a predominantly
Jewish neighborhood in Skokie, Illinois. The march touched a national nerve and
sparked debate over the scope of first amendment rights. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (19.78).
109. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542. Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
110. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
111. Id. at 2542; cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
112. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
113. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
114. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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the one envisioned by St. Paul, or by academic institutions that
have passed similar "hate speech" codes. Rather, they want to
regulate the speaker in the interests of a normative society; expressly rejecting the Court's protection for provocative "speech"
in Tinker.
Of course, there is always the remote prospect that the Supreme Court, or a majority of its members, will feel that "hate
speech" is such a threat to society that First Amendment protections ought to be relaxed in order to permit its regulation.
Even if that view never prevails, it does not mean that the
R.A. V. analysis will be applied to schools' attempts to regulate
similar speech "on campus."llG
After all, the R.A. V. case only addressed a criminal ordinance that forbade and punished a form of political speech in
the public marketplace of ideas. This whole article is meant to
demonstrate how schools have been treated differently in the
balancing of individual and institutional prerogatives. Thus, I
cannot share the view of some that the R.A. V. decision necessarily represents a "death knell for [school] speech codes" or
"turns most ... [existing] codes into hamburger."llG
Intolerance and confrontation seem to have been increasing
recently on campus and, as inculcators of morals, ethics and val- .
ues, educators have a legitimate reason to encourage positive social behavior within the school environment and to punish that
which threatens the intellectual community, in terms of its
peace, of course, but possibly its "mission" as well. Tinker recognized this; and Bethel School applied it to speech that was "offensive to ... modesty and decency."l17 After all, school codes
. of behavior are not criminal statutes, and educators are not police. Moreover, courts of law generally give educators wide discretionary latitude to regulate the school environment; much
more than would be given civil authority to regulate the public
marketplace. A content-based regulation poses some problems to
be sure, but the Supreme Court has not rejected them utterly,
115. C{. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
116. The Chronicle of Higher Education, July I, 1992, at 1 and accompanying story
at A19.
117. Bethel .. 478 U.S. at 678-79.
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particularly where the welfare of youth is involved. 118 While the
latitude granted to school officials will probably be greater in the
case of primary and secondary schools than colleges and universities, a thoughtfully justified and drawn (and locally-enforced)
"hate speech" regulation might be permitted on campus - particularly those polarized or threatened by factional ferment - in
ways that would never be permitted in St. Paul.
Although Justice Brandeis favored "education" to "repression," some schools are just as likely to pursue the latter
method, particularly if they are either completely committed to
their role of inculcating civility in their students,119 or the problem of "incendiary speech" IS severe in that school
environment. 120

VI. SCHOOL REGULATION OF "STUDENT
NEWSPAPERS"
Few other areas of so-called "school law" have evoked so
much litigation as student publications, in a variety of forms.121
Admittedly, a number of the early cases involved college and not
secondary-school newspapers,t22 but Tinker (although it involved "free speech") gave no reason to believe that ,students'
free press rights were not equally implicated. 123
The majority of these cases, whether they arise at secondary
or post-secondary institutions, involve student newspapers that
receive some support from the institution. As a general rule,
118. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982).
119. See generally Bethel, 478 U.S. at 675.
120. Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1970).
121. J. DUSCHA & T.C. FISCHER. THE CAMPUS PRESS: FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY,
American Ass'n of State Colleges & Univs., D.C., 1973.
122. See, e.g., Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala.
1967); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Channing Club v.
Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d
1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D.Colo. 1971); Joyner v. Whiting, 341 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. N.C. 1972), reu'd, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
123. The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of the press . . . . "This prohibition is extended, through the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, to state efforts to control the press. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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cases do not involve "house organs," however.124 Two secondaryschool cases decided in 1977, Gambino v. Fairfax County School
Board l2 r. and Trachtman v. Anker,128 set the stage for an eventual U.S. Supreme Court ruling. It would be ten years before
that decision finally came, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.127 When it did, the Court took a position that
eroded the "guarantees" of Tinker even further. The Gambino
and Trachtman cases presented the polar positions from which
the Supreme Court chose in Hazelwood.
Gambino involved an article submitted for publication in
The Farm News, a student newspaper published by a public
school in Fairfax, Virginia. The principal reviewed the contents
of the article, entitled "Sexually Active Students Fail to Use
Contraceptives," and found that certain portions violated school
policy and should therefore be deleted. The principal agreed,
however, that the remainder of the article (a survey of student
attitudes toward contraception) could be published. The student
editors brought suit, claiming that the whole article should be
printed. The federal district court agreed, and enjoined the
school from interfering with the publication of the article. u8 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the lower court that the
School Board had established The Farm News as a "public fo- .
rum for student expression," and hence "the general power of
the Board to regulate course content [did] not apply."12s
Trachtman also involved a school official's pre-publication
disapproval of a student article. The principal of Stuyvestant
High School in New York City prohibited student staff members
of the school newspaper, The Stuyvestant Voice, from distributing a sex questionnaire to fellow students and publishing the results in the newspaper. The Second Circuit found that "school
authorities did not act unreasonably in deciding that the proposed questionnaire should not be distributed" on school property. This is a far cry from the "compelling state interest" test
124.
484 U.S.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See DUSHCA & FISCHER, supra note 121, at pp. 59-71; Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,
260, 262-66 (1988).
564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977).
563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977).
Gambino, 564 F.2d at 158 (emphasis added).
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ordinarily used. The fact that "harmful consequences might result to students" if the questionnaire were distributed and the
results published, was found by the court to be a substantial
basis for restraint, within the "forecast" requirements of
Tinker.130 Thus, the standard of judicial review was garbled, but
clearly lower than that ordinarily applied to censorship.
Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court had a clear choice when the
Hazelwood case came along. Indeed, that case might be said to
fall into that category (curriculum-based publications) excepted
by the Fourth Circuit in the Gambino decision.
Hazelwood inv.olved a school newspaper known as the Spectrum. The high school principal, to whom page proofs of the
newspaper were routinely given for review prior to publication,
objected to the contents of two articles scheduled to appear in
the Spring issue. 131 Without fully consulting the journalism advisor, or developing adequate facts, the principal decided to delete
the two pages on which the objectionable stories were due to
appear. 132

In a bare majority opinion authored by Justice White, the
Court upheld the authority of the principal to regulate the content of a newspaper that it found was "school-sponsored" and
"part of the curriculum." The principal had this authority, the
majority felt, because the Spectrum was not a traditional public
forum. ISS The Court held that, since public schools "do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks and other traditional
public forums" they must ·"by policy or by practice" be opened
before "indiscriminate use by the general public" would be al130. Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 519-20 (emphasis added).
131. One of the stories described three students' experience with pregnancy, while
the other discussed a divorce and its impact on a student attending the school. With
respect to the article on teenage pregnancy, the principal believed that the references to
sexual activity and birth control were "inappropriate." He was also concerned that, although the girls' names were not used in the article, their identities might be deduced
from the text. The principal also believed that the parents referenced in the divorce
story "should have been given an opportunity to respond to [certain remarks contained
in the article] ... or to consent to their publication." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263.
132. The deleted pages also contained articles on teenage marriage, runaways, and
juvenile delinquents, and a general article on teenage pregnancy.
133. The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's view that the Spectrum was a public
forum because it was "intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint."
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265-70.
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lowed. The Supreme Court majority found no "intent [by school
officials] to open the pages of the Spectrum to 'indiscriminate
use' by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body
generally." Instead they "reserve[d] the forum for its intended
purpose," as a "supervised learning experience for journalism
students." Accordingly, the Court distinguished Tinker and held
that "school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of
[the] Spectrum in any reasonable manner."13'
There is no discussion in Tinker about the school opening
its venue to student discourse. Nor did the Tinker "forecast"
rule use a "reasonableness" standard. Rather, the school was
presumed to be open to student expression (the general public is
a red herring) until and unless school authorities can establish a
"substantial" reason for closing it to such discourse. The needs
of the curriculum, of course, are one such reason. But that would
apply, even if Hazelwood School qualified as such, to only a limited number of student newspapers.
The Court found that, unlike Tinker, which involved individual "student speech," Hazelwood involved "[a] school-sponsored publication[] ... [an] expressive activit[y] that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the school." Therefore, "[e]ducators are
entitled to exercise greater control [over this form of expression
and] ... do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over [its] style and content . . ~ so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. "1311 This is an ambiguous standard, because most school
newspapers do bear the school's "imprimatur" in some way, but
most are not curriculum-related, at least in any formal manner.
The Supreme Court thus expressly rejected the Eighth Circuit's application of the Tinker standard to Hazelwood, for the
lower court had found "no evidence in the record that the principal could have reasonably forecast that the censored articles or
134. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70 (emphasis added).
135. These "legitimate" concerns include "assur[ingJ that participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the
views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school." [d. at 27173.
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any materials in the censored articles would have materially disrupted classwork or given rise to substantial disorder in the
school."138 This difference of legal perspective may be made
compatible, if Hazelwood is limited to its special facts.
There is no real dispute that the Spectrum was published as
part of a curricular offering (ie. Journalism II class). There is no
real doubt in my mind, and indeed I predicted some years ago,
that academic institutions have near full control over academic
and curricular vehicles, what I then called "house organs."137 If
narrowly construed, the holding in Hazelwood is compatible
with that legal view, and does no great damage to Tinker's principles, except for refusing to expand them. The Hazelwood dicta
is another matter. It suggests that school officials can not only
exercise considerable control over "lessons," even if somewhat
extra-curricular, but also act as "thought police," protecting students from "material that may be inappropriate to their level of
maturity," or which might be "erroneously attributed to the
school."13s The former of these positions was purposely limited
by Tinker, and the latter can be accomplished by much less in- .
trusive means than the censorship practiced in Hazelwood.
If Tinker's goal was to allow into the school "marketplace of
ideas" all information that would not cause disruption, or interfere with the school's proper mission, was not the Hazelwood
School principal a bit ham-fisted in his attempt to censor the
articles? The principal testified that he had no objection to the
other material due to appear on the pages that contained the
censored articles. Yet, rather than deleting just the objectionable
stories, the principal deleted both pages in their entirety. He did
not even explore with his journalism instructor other ways to
balance the interests of students and school.

The dissent, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, suggested that the school
could have published a disclaimer, or "issue[d] its own response
clarifying the official position on the matter and explaining why
the student position is wrong." Said they: "Tinker teaches us
that the state educator's undeniable, and undeniably vital, man136. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265 (emphasis added).

137.

DUSCHA

&

FISCHER,

supra note 121.

138. Hazelwooq" 484 U.S. at 271.
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date to inculcate moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but stateapproved topics and advocacy of all but the official position."139
The dissenters felt the majority opinion illustrated "how readily
school officials (and courts) can camouflage viewpoint discrimination as the 'mere' protection of students from sensitive
topics. "140
Simply put, the lesson of Tinker seems to be that students
possess, even at school, all those Constitutional rights that
school officials cannot justify taking away; whereas Hazelwood
reverses the equation, and accords to students only those rights
that school administrators allow. This would be less threatening
to students' budding Constitutional rights if Hazelwood was limited to curriculum-related matters, which seemed to be the majority's central premise. The narrow factual circumstances of
Hazelwood are likely to be ignored or quickly forgotten, whereas
the substantial grant of authority to school officials is likely to
endure; indeed grow. 141
Two other recent Supreme Court cases deserve at least
some mention, due to their somewhat contradictory outcomes
respecting the Constitutional rights of student authors. In one,
Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,142
the Supreme Court refused to allow the University's dismissal of
a graduate student for distribution on school grounds of an "underground" newspaper, the Free Press, which contained materials that allegedly violated a University rule against "indecent
conduct or speech."143 The case involved a university and not a
high school, of course, and the lower courts held the material to
be "obscene" (which it was not). Moreover, it is possible that
schools could set a stricter standard for on-campus communica139. [d. at 285-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. [d. at 288.

141. Immediately upon the heels of the Hazelwood decision, local newspapers carried stories of several incidences of attempted school censorship of student newspapers
that were not part of the curriculum. See Student Editors Brace for Censor's Hand,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 1988, at 28; Paper Gets F from Some Medfield Teachers, BosTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1989, at 17; cf. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
142. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
143. [d. The front cover of the paper displayed a cartoon depicting club-wielding
policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. Articles elsewhere in
the paper contained offensive or indecent language.
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tions than could be set in the public marketplace, in the interest
of "decency."u4 In a terse per curiam opinion, however, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, stating: "the First
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard
in the academic community with respect .to the content of
speech."I411 The Supreme Court's protection of the student's
right in Papish cannot be fully explained by the fact that the
newspaper was not school-supported (although the facts of Papish are closer to Tinker than Hazelwood); nor that the student
audience was more mature and less captive than that in Hazelwood, since a large number of teenagers were involved. Rather,
the messages of Ms. Papish were legitimate expression in the
academy, as was Ms. Tinker's, and were not likely to upset a
media-saturated teenager of today.
The second case, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily/46 also involving a university, took just the opposite approach. In Zurcher, a
college newspaper's office was searched, pursuant to a valid warrant, by police officers looking chiefly for photographic evidence
of' a violent collision between students occupying a campus
building and police officers sent to remove them. In the course of
the search, "photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks and
wastepaper baskets were searched." Although "[l]ocked drawers
and rooms were not opened ... [t]he officers apparently had
[an] opportunity to read notes and correspondence during the
search .... "147 Thus, the search, even if warranted by a magistrate, approximated a "fishing expedition," and far exceeded the
scope of a search of a general-circulation newspaper that a court
is likely to permit, although no such case has been reviewed by
the Supreme Court. us While the Supreme Court precedent denying news-reporters a general Constitutional privilege against
revealing their confidential sources to a grand jury investigating
criminal conduct U9 is cited as a justification for the Zurcher outcome, the Branzburg case is surgically-precise in its analysis and
application when compared to the cavalier dismissal of the Stan144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 669
Id. at 671.
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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ford Daily's concerns in Zurcher. 1110
VII. DUE PROCESS/CHIEFLY ACADEMIC
At least since the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, un the rights of
students to a certain degree of process (allegedly that "due"
them) prior to their dismissal from public institutions for disciplinary infractions has been fairly well established. I112 The process guidelines prerequisite to faculty dismissals go somewhat
further back in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. IllS Some
schools have granted students and teachers more process than is
required by the Constitution. This extra degree of protection, if
legally guaranteed in school literature, such as a catalogue, a student or faculty "handbook" of rules and regulations, or in a dormitory contract, are entitlements conferred by contract, rather
than by the Constitution, just as process protections, if any, are
generally guaranteed by contract at private schools. 111•
In any event, this area of school law is so well covered in the
literature,11111 and generally so well known and enforced by school
officials, that there is little purpose served in repeating it here.
Far less well explored is the process due to students dis150. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 563-66; cf. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 573-74 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
151. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). As do many
authors, I trace the modern legal tradition of procedural due process for students in
disciplinary proceedings to' Dixon which, for its time, was a thoughtful and constructive
opinion.
152. I explored this .subject in a fairly comprehensive "White Paper" for the American Association of State Colleges and Universities in 1970, entitled Due Process in the
Student-Institutional Relationship, AASCU Studies, ERIC Clearinghouse, Washington,
D.C., 1970. That study influenced The Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, U.S. G.P.O. (1970). See also WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, Procedural Due Process
and State Uniuersity Students, 10 UCLA L. REV. 368 (1963); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 576 n.8 (1975).
153. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). All of these cases were decided before GOBS v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975), the first student due process decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.
154. See generally FISCHER, supra note 152 at 4-5.
155. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 333-82 (3d ed.
1992); H.C. HUDGINS, JR., & RICHARD S. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY IsSUES AND COURT DECISIONS 311-45, (3d ed. 1991).
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missed for academic reasons. Perhaps this is because the U.S.
Supreme Court has been loathe to recognize a clear Constitutional "right" in such situations. lli6 The jurisprudence also is not
nearly as rich as that involving disciplinary due process. The
Court's first decision in this field did not come until 1978: Board
of Curators v. Horowitz.lli7 Two more decisions followed swiftly
on its heels; Board of Regents of the University of the State of
New York v. Tomanio,Ili8 and Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing. lli9
The first, Horowitz, the so-called "dirty fingernails" case/ 60
set a fair, and perhaps even generous, standard of process, prior
to the academic dismissal of a probationary medical school student in her last year of study. Although the outcome may seem
harsh, the student involved was given ample notice of her academic deficiencies, a second opportunity to prove herself to an
impartial non-faculty panel (loosely characterized by the Court
as an "appeal"), and was measured by an objective, even democratic, standard of performance. I61 In that respect, all members
of the Court felt that the school gave Ms. Horowitz all of the
process to which she was entitled. That said, however, the majority raised the question whether Ms. Horowitz had any legal
interest (liberty or property) in her' further education, to which a
due process right might attach. I62 "Assuming," but not deciding,
that she did, the Court noted that:
156. None of the reported cases are generous to the student, but, as a general rule,
they require some process and consistency from the school in its dealing with allegedly
academically-deficient students. The latest case, however, Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), not only gave the student very little process, the
university was relieved of the consistency standard as well.
157. In Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), the Court noted that
[m]isconduct and failure to attain a standard of scholarship
cannot be equated. A hearing may be required to determine
charges of misconduct, but a hearing may be useless or harmful in finding out the truth concerning scholarship. There is a
clear dichotomy between a student's due process rights in disciplinary dismissals and in academic dismissals.
[d. at 87-88 n.4 (citing Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1976)).
158. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
159. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
160. The moniker derives from the failure of the medical school student to pass her
clinical requirements, in part for a lack of concern for personal hygiene, including dirt
under her fingernails.
161. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 82-92.
162. [d. at 84.
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The ultimate decision to dismiss [Ms. Horowitz]
... was careful and deliberate ... [and that
there was a] significant difference [for due process
purposes] between the failure of a student to
meet academic standards and the violation by a
student of valid rules of conduct .... [F]ar less
stringent procedural requirements [are necessary]
in the case of an academic dismissal. 183

Since the principal disciplinary due process case, Goss v. Lopez,
required only an informal give-and-take between student and
administrator (although that case involved a short-term suspension),164 it is difficult to imagine what "less" the student
threatened with academic dismissal is entitled to.
Indeed, the Horowitz Court majority concludes that students facing academic dismissal may be Constitutionally "due"
little or no process, that courts of law are ill-equipped to make
such judgments, and should exercise "care and restraint" before
interposing themselves in school academic processes, at least
when there is no evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct 165
by the school. 166 .
The second case, Tomanio, is not nearly as generous as regards process as was Horowitz, although the "academic" judgment seems equally well-supported on its facts. Ms. Tomanio's
civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could, and did, turn
entirely on whether it was time-barred in federal court. The substance of her claim, however (addressed by some members of the
court), raised the question whether an unlicensed chiropractor,
who had failed to pass a New York licensing examination after
seven attempts, was Constitutionally-guaranteed a hearing of
some sort before her written request for a waiver of the examination requirement was rejected by the University board. The
Tomanio majority did not address the merits of the case, it being unnecessary to their decision. Justice Stevens, concurring in
163. [d. at 85-86.

164. 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975).
165. This is the least-probing judicial standard of review of public administrative
decision-making. The court's review inquires not whether the decision made was the best
or correct one, but only whether it could not be reasonably supported by the facts. Thus,
it is virtually impossible to prove that the decision was objectively wrong.
166. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87-92; cf. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 97-108 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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the result, and Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, however, felt some process was due,167 notwithstanding the fact that
New York's statutory scheme placed waiver requests "in the discretion of the Board of Regents."16S On the facts, this discretion
did not appear to have been abused, although the whole purpose
of a hearing is to determine whether there was official abuse of
discretion or not. Nothing, however, in the jurisprudence of academic due process (or disciplinary due process, in many cases)
guarantees a face-to-face hearing with the decision-maker.169
The most recent case, Ewing, is, from a factual perspective,
no more compelling than the other two. The Supreme Court's
prompt and unanimous dispatch of the case may reflect a growing impatience on its part with the whole genre. Once again, the
Supreme Court did not conclude that voluntarily-enrolled students in public college academic programs had any property interest in their continued enrollment or graduation. Instead, the
Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that Mr. Ewing did.
Then they unanimously held that Mr. Ewing's dismissal from a
six-year undergraduate-plus-medical degree program (Inteflex)
was legally justified, since he failed, at the end of his fourth year
of study, five of seven subjects on a two-day written test administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners. 17o
The Court was probably justified in concluding that a pamphlet, entitled On Becoming a Doctor, was more descriptive
than contractual when it suggested that failing students were
"provided [an opportunity] to make up the failure in a second
exam,"l71 and that Mr. Ewing had been given an ample opportunity to plead his case in person before University authorities. 172
This does not fully justify, however, the University's deviation
from its own written representations and past practices. 173 The
Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 492-99.
[d. at 494 (emphasis added).
[d.
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215-22.
171. [d. at 219.
172. [d. at 216-17.
167.
168.
169.
170.

173. Not only did the brochur& memorialize the commitment of the school to allow
retesting, history revealed that, of the 32 students who had failed Part I of the exam,
including 7 Inteftex students, all were allowed to retake the test at least once. [d. at 219.
"Ewing was the only University of Michigan medical student who initially failed the
NBME Part I between 1975 and 1982, and was not allowed an opportunity for a retest."
[d. at 221.
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only justification can be - since schools ought to be bound by
their voluntary commitments, whether Constitutional or contractual - that the school's decision was not arbitrary.174
Rather, according to the Court, it ','was made conscientiously
and with careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of Ewing's
academic career."176 In the opinion of the unanimous Court,
judges who review "genuinely academic" decisions, "should show
great respect for the faculty's professional judgment."l76
Hence, the Supreme Court has unflinchingly taken the position that academic decisions are not nearly as "adversarial" as
disciplinary actions, and that academic decisions require expertise that the Court generally does not ,possess. Moreover, the
Court is predisposed to assume that the academic decisionmaker has acted fairly, and not on the basis of any malevolent
motive. Consequently, the Court has, for the most part, refused
to inject itself into academic decisionmaking.
Thus, except for the seemingly modest retreat in academic
process from Horowitz to Ewing, it would be false to say that
students have lost any great degree of constitutional protection
from academic decisions since Tinker; they never had much in
the first place.
Whereas some due process is accorded in disciplinary proceedings,177 even that modest amount of process has been
eroded.178 In its opinions, the Supreme Court appears to counte~
nance school officials' impatience with affording "process" in
every action they take. The Court has elected to leave the question of process more in the hands of school officials, except in
extreme cases.
174. Ewing received the lowest failing grade ever earned on Part I of the NBME in
Michigan's program. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 216.
175. [d. at 225.
176. [d. at 225 (quoting Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 96 n.6 (Powell,
J., concurring)).
177. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school administrators are required to provide minimum requirements of notice and hearing prior to a ten-day suspension).
178. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (teacher and principal need only exercise normal prudence and restraint when deciding to administer corporal punishment for
disciplinary purposes); see also, Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (two-day
loss of rights for delivering lewd speech to school assembly).
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The last two areas upon which I wish to touch are religion
and search and seizure in public schools.
VIII. FREE EXERCISE
RELIGION179

AND

ESTABLISHMENT

OF

A long line of well-known cases, beginning with Lemon v.
Kurtzman,180 has established the circumstances in which grants
of public largess to private (mostly parochial) sc4001s would "establish" religion, thereby violating the First Amendment. Far
less attention has been given to the question whether the refusal
to bestow equal public largess on private schools, or to grant religiously-conscious students and teachers certain freedoms in
public schools, inhibits the "free exercise" of religion (also guaranteed by the First Amendment).
In one of its earlier school cases, West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, the U.S. Supreme court held (during
war time) that schools could not force their students to salute
the nation's flag, thereby compelling a belief in the country.18l In
later cases the Court forbade forced prayer/ 82 refused to allow
the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms,183 and
struck down a state statute that required the teaching of "crea179. The first amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make .no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. CONST.
amend. 1. One commentator has paraphrased the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the establishment clause as follows:
The free exercise clause means that a person may believe what
he wishes. He may believe in his God or no God, and government may not interfere with that belief. The establishment
clause means that government is neutral in matters of religion.
It does not favor one religion over another, many religions
over some, or all religions over none. It does not promote one
religious activity over another nor does it compel participation
in a religious activity.
HUDGINS & VACCA, supra note 155 at 399.
180. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). State statutes providing state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools violate the Constitutionally-required separation of
church and state: the so-called "wall of separation."
181. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). "If there is any fixed star in our constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can describe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein . . . ."
. 182. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (although
students could be excused therefrom upon their parents' written request).
183. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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tion-science" to balance Darwinism. ls•
Only Wisconsin v. Yoder recognized a right to the "free exercise" of religion, when it held that "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevent the state from compelling [the parents of
Amish children] to cause their children to attend formal high
school to age 16."ISII But this was a "parental rights" case, not a
"minors' rights case" and it did not involve the right to "free
exercise" in school. This difference in the enforcement of the establishment and free-exercise cl~uses caused some Justices to
opine that the Court's aggressive exclusion of religion from public schools represented not "neutrality," but "hostility" towards
it. ISS
It was not until the passage of the Equal Access Act in
1984,ls7 that minor school children were given a free exercise

right to pursue their religious interests, along with other secular
interests, in public schools. The Act only applied to schools that
accepted federal funds and created a "limited public forum. "ISS
Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens,189 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990, addressed the application of the Equal Access Act ("the Act") to
Westside's refusal to allow a student religious group, the Christian Bible Study Club, permission to meet on school premises
184. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
185. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
186. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 84-85, 106-107 (1985) (comparing
opinions written separately by O'Connor, concurring, Burger, dissenting, Rehnquist, J.J.,
dissenting).
187. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1984). The Act's legislative history indicates that it
was passed to "clarify and confirm the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and free exercise of religion which accrue to public school students who desire voluntarily to exercise those rights during extracurricular periods of the
school day when the school permits extracurricular activities." S. REP. No. 357, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2306, 2349.
188.
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited
public forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a
meeting within that limited forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at
such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988). A "limited public forum" meant that the school recognized or
sponsored student activities that were not related to the curriculum.
189. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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during non-instructional time. The Court held that once a federally-funded public secondary school created a "limited open forum," it could not deny access to or discriminate against any
"noncurriculum related student group" based on the religious,
political, or philosophical content of the students' message. l90 A
majority of the Court found that the Act did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, since it did not
"favor" religion per se, but only put all non-curricular clubs on
an equal footing. Thus, it was a "free speech" entitlement, like
Tinker.
The only type of student organization that appeared to
need this type of Congressional assistance was a religious group,
and if the object of the legislation was to assist those groups,
even to gain equal access, it would violate the first "prong" of
the so-called Lemon test, and be unconstitutional. l9l Recognizing this problem with the much-used, but now dated, Lemon
test, a plurality of the Court, led by Justice O'Connor, argued
for a more flexible "endorsement" test to measure "establishment" clause violations, and required the school to provide access to the religious student group.l92
190. [d. The Court examined closely the Act's use of the terms "noncurriculum related student group," and "limited open forum." Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, suggested a broad interpretation of "noncurriculum" to accommodate Congress'
intent that a low threshold trigger application of the Act. [d. at 239-40. If the Court
narrowly defined those groups that are directly related to the school's curriculum, it
would ensure that schools could not attempt to claim, as Westside did, that all student
groups are curriculum related, and hence the Act inapplicable. [d. The Court then concluded that since Westside did allow such non curriculum-based groups as the "Subsurfer" and Chess club, the school maintained a "limited open forum" under the terms
of the Act.
191. This famous "test," first completely articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), provided that a public act supporting religion would violate the
Constitution's prohibition against "establishment" if it violated anyone of three
"prongs," sequentially: (1) that it have a secular legislative purpose; (2) that it have a
"principal" or "primary effect" that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) that
the state and its administration must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
192. O'Connor's opinion upheld the lower court's application of her own "endorsement" test, a reformulation of the Lemon test, which she first introduced in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). This test reformulates the first
two "prongs" of the Lemon test, by asking whether the government endorsement "convey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The inquiry into the government's intent is defe~ential and limited, unlike the
secular purpose prong of the Lemon test, which concerns the government's subjective
intent, and the second prong which focuses on the government's objective effect. In a
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Congressional legislation concerning whether students
should be allowed to pursue religious interests during noninstructional time blunted the usual scope of the Court's Constitutional analysis of this issue; namely, the tension between the
Free Speech and Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment on
the one hand, and its Establishment Clause on the other. The
Court had been inching towards a change of posture on this difficult constitutional question for years, but chose not to use
Mergens for that purpose. The next opportunity it had, in the
Court's latest school "prayer" case, Lee v. Weisman/ 93 the majority backed away even further. '
In any event, Mergens ~eems to be a victory for students.
By balancing the right of students to express themselves against
the need for schools to exercise control over the educational environment, the court leaned in favor of the students. Bravo
Tinker! However, one commentator has suggested the Court has
"underestimated the potential danger of government endorsement of religious speech and provided a backdoor access for organized prayer to enter public schools."194
Whether it enters through the "backdoor" or frontdoor, the
issue is not "entry" but reentry. The truth is that, but for a zealous, but leaky, effort during the latter half of this century to
hermetically seal public primary and secondary schools against
religion, there has been a certain "tradition" of religiosity associated with American life and institutions. 196 The Supreme Court
has already allowed for it at public ceremonies,196 and in public
colleges,197 and now, as a result of Mergens, public secondary
case decided this term, many people thought a majority of the Court might finally adopt
O'Connor's test, thereby supplanting the Lemon test. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992)
193. 112 S. Ct. at 2649. The lower courts enjoined the practices, applying the Lemon
test. Twenty amici briefs were filed in the Lee case.
194. LEAH GALLANT MORGANSTEIN, Board of Education of Westside Community u.
Mergens: Three "R's" + Religion = Mergens, 41 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 221, 222 (1991); see
also Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.O. Wash. 1991).
195. This was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers, 465
U.S. 785 (1983), involving a publicly· paid chaplain who opened each session of Ne·
braska's legislature with a prayer. The establishment clause was not violated due to this
"nation's history of religious acknowledgment."
196. Id.; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
197. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), although the right of college students
to conduct religious worship services in a public school building was based chiefly on free
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schools.
Lee, however, hews a little closer to the Constitutional line .
. Whereas the students in Mergens were entirely self-selected and
engaged in an optional activity, Lee involves a public school
commencement ceremony which, although not compulsory, is
often not considered truly optional. Hence, the audience is
somewhat "captive,"198 and may merit protection from the ceremony's invocation and benediction which, while purposely nondenominational, still were delivered by clergy and constitute a
"prayer" of sorts. Is this Constitutionally offensive?

A liberal reading of the Lemon test might have allowed the
practice to continue, for the impact of this particular act in the
context of the larger event may render it harmless in an establishment sense. 199 Conversely, a majority of the Court might
have finally embraced Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test,
and still find that these official acts violated it. In fact, the Supreme Court majority took neither of these positions in Lee. 20o
Instead, Justice Kennedy took the labori.ng oar and wrote a
five to four decision in which Justice O'Connor joined. She also
joined in separate, concurring opinions by Justices Blackmun
and Souter, but wrote no opinion of her own. Perhaps this was
because she finally despaired of garnering a fifth vote for her
"endorsement" test, although I personally doubt this. If it were
so, it would be sad indeed. For hers is an eminently fair and
balanced test for an accommodation of both church and state.
Perhaps Justice O'Connor was preoccupied by the narrow
five to four consensus she was building in an abortion case, upholding Roe u. Wade. 201 Or she may honestly believe (as well she
might) that even ecumenical invocations and benedictions have
no place in public secondary graduation ceremonies. That is, the
Lee case may be limited to its facts, as Justice Kennedy somewhat suggests in his opinion.202 After 'all, attending one's own
speech, and the university'S attempt at content-regulation in this case.
198. Cf. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
199. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
200. 112 S. Ct. at 2649.
201. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
202. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
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graduation ceremonies is really not a matter of choice for most
students or their parents. Hence, they constitute a virtual captive, minor audience, and compelled religious acknowledgement
in that setting goes beyond that approved in both Widmar and
Marsh.
Whatever the situation, Justice Kennedy, with majority
backing, was unequivocal in his statement that "[t]his case does
not require us to revisit the difficult questions dividing us in recent cases ... the accommodation by the State for the religious
beliefs and practices of many of its citizens .... Thus we do not
accept the invitation of petitioners ... to reconsider our decision
in Lemon v. Kurtzman."203 Hence, it would appear that Lemon
is the operative establishment "test" for the foreseeable future
- at least in "easy cases" - and, using that test, there is very
little room in public school for religious "speech." How then will
we deal with, for example, a university professor who occasionally refers to his religious beliefs in his lectures?204 Or a fifthgrade teacher who makes no secret of his Christian beliefs, albeit
without overt proselytizing?20I1 Will the Supreme Court's accommodating posture in Mergens be ignored by lower.courts,206 especially after Lee's ringing affirmation of Lemon?
All told, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area has
become increasingly picayune, without truly succeeding in insulating public schools from religious expression. It also risks some
ridicule, as resulted in its foray against "obscenity."207 Most importantly, it should evidence that public secondary 'school students are not the programmable automatons that the dicta in
these cases might infer, and that they are capable of sifting and
judging even "religious" messages for themselves.

203. [d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
204. Bishop v. Delchamps, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
3026 (1992)
205. Roberta v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992).
206. See Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
207. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754-56 (1982).
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IX. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SEARCHING
STUDENTS ON SCHOOL GROUNDS
The final area for discussion involves the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and its prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure, as applied in the academic setting.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and .seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly· describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Questions regarding what makes a search reasonable or unreasonable, whether the warrant requirement must always be
met, and what constitutes probable cause, have been left to the
courts to decide. A treatise would be needed to adequately address the thicket of legal precedent that has grown up around
these issues - at least when applied to police enforcing the
criminal law.
The study of this body of precedent by school officials
would be more relevant if it was routinely applied in the school
environment. However, in the only school case the U.S. Supreme
Court has decided addressing that subject, New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,208 the Court majority indicated that it would not apply
that jurisprudence literally, but would make an exception in the
school environment. Specifically, "probable cause" is not a rigid
standard to be uniformly enforced regardless of the state entity
performing the search or the purpose thereof, but a flexible requirement that may be lowered as situations demand.
Three basic principles have developed through the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and have been engrafted onto its literal language. 209 First, the Court fashioned
specific and limited exceptions to the Amendment's premise
208. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
209. See id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, (1987)
(giving a similar, though less clear, account).
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that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. 210 Second,
general police searches, whether conducted pursuant to a warrant or under an exception thereto, are "reasonable" if there is
"probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed or
is about to be committed, and that evidence of the crime will be
found in the place to be searched.2l1 Third, searches that are less
threatening and less intrusive may be justified, absent a warrant
or probable cause, by balancing the interests at stake, provided
that sufficient weight is given to the individual privacy interests
that are likely to be infringed. 212 This too is a "reasonableness"
standard, lacking probable cause as a rationale, and so depends
upon the surrounding circumstances for its justification.
School administrators, exercising their authority to maintain security and order within schools, have often searched students and their property, generally to unearth contraband, primarily drugs. A threshold question then is whether those public
officials who are conducting searches to protect and discipline
their charges are, like police, subject to the prohibitions of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court answered this question in the
affirmative in T.L.O. Hence, a brief review of the principal Supreme Court cases concerning the Fourth Amendment is
advisable.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United
States 213 established that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Though this view departs significantly from
prior Court precedent,2l-t the majority opinion by Justice Stewart lacked detail. Therefore, lower courts were forced to turn to
210. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. I, 20 (1968); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984).
211. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (announcing
that an official has probable cause when he is aware of "facts and circumstances [that]
warrant a prudent man into believing that the offense has been committed").
212. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
213. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
214. Previous Supreme Court opinions had focused on whether a particular ·space
was a "constitutionally protected area" and, if so, requiring that the police must "physically intrude" into this area for there to be an illegal search. See, e.g., Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1967) (addressing what constitutes a "constitutionally protected area"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (adding the "physical intrusion" requirement).
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Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz and what has come
to be known as the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.2UI
The principal focus of attention given this test by courts and
commentators has been what expectation of privacy is "reasonable" in the eyes of society.216
Just what expectation is objectively "reasonable" on the
part of the individual searched, depends upon whether the expectation of privacy is "justified" under the circumstances. Generally, an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in any object or act he holds out to the public. 217 If however, a governmental practice "significantly jeopardizes" a legitimate "sense of security," a warrant should be required. 218
215. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Katz u. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (Harlan, J., concurring». Terry was the first U.S. Supreme Court case in which a
majority of the Court refers to Justice Harlan's opinion as creating a "test."
Justice Harlan's explanation for the majority's position that the fourth amendment
"protected people, not places" was stated thus:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain
view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand,
conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986) (embracing the Harlan test).
216. The actual or subjective expectation of privacy "test" might be dismissed as
providing an "inadequate index of fourth amendment protection" and therefore means
little apart from the second requirement. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5
(1979).
One commentator has examined the first part of the test and provided a lucid explanation of how courts should analyze a "subjective" determination of reason~bleness: an
individual "need not take extraordinary precautions against the specific way in which the
state conduct[s] a surveillance. [He may, by conduct] demonstrate[] an intention to keep
activities and things ... private, and ... not knowingly expose them to the open view of
the public." Note, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 753-54 (1985).
217. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43.
218. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), explains
this point. Harlan suggested that whether or not an individual's reliance on privacy is
"justified" must be answered by "assessing the nature of a particular practice and the
likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." [d. at 786.
Harlan's dissent in White touches upon what is perhaps the driving force behind his
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Another important line of Supreme Court cases, one having
a more direct bearing on school searches, addresses the "probable cause" requirement as it applies to regulatory inspections.
"Probable cause" is central to the right of an individual to
be secure from unreasonable governmental intrusions. The term
itself arises in the second part of the Fourth Amendment, commonly called the warrant clause. The warrant clause makes it
clear that search warrants, or arrest warrants, will not be valid
unless the issuing authority (typically a court or magistrate) has
been convinced that there is probable cause to issue them.
Housing inspections, like school searches, do not usually involve
police, or suspected criminal behavior, and therefore generally
lack "probable cause" in any literal sense. Are routine housing,
fire, and health inspections intrusive enough to fall afoul of the
Fourth Amendment?
These inspections, like school searches, are generally based
on public health and safety concerns. Typically, the inspections
are conducted by employees of administrative agencies, whose
role it is to ensure compliance with local health and safety regulations. Most inspections are routine and made in the course of
periodic or geographic inspection programs, although some are
made in response to specific complaints.
It is the "routine" nature of such inspections that led the
Supreme Court to hold in Camara u. Municipal Court of the
City and County of San Francisc0 219 that such searches are generally "reasonable" and hence the "probable cause" required for
a "warrant" - if one is insisted upon - will be met "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards' for conducting an
area inspection are satisfied."220
concurrence in Katz. Namely, the overriding importance of the word "secure" in the text
of the fourth amendment. When Katz shifted the focus away from the "place" itself, to
the relationship between the place and the "person," it may have "release[dl the Fourth
Amendment ... from the moorings of precedent" so that its scope may now be defined
by the "logic of its central concepts." EDMUND W. KITCH. KATZ V. UNITED STATES: THE
LIMITS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 133. Hence, an adult citizen may
have a more reasonable and legitimate expectation of being secure from a police search
of his home or person than minor children might from a teacher's search of their school
desks or lockers.
219. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
220. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). In
Camara, the Court pointed to features of housing inspections that support their inherent
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Camara held that housing inspections do intrude "upon ...
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment"221 primarily because an individual's private residence is being searched. The
Court found,' however, that such inspections need only be based
upon a "reasonable" regulatory goal, and not on probable cause
to believe that a crime has been committed, or is about to be
committed, and that evidence of the crime will be found in the
place to be searched. 222 In this respect, administrative probable
cause is different from criminal probable cause, and a metal detector at the entrance to a school building would doubtless fall
into the former category. A similar view 223 of the "probable
cause" requirement was taken in T.L.O.

T.L. O. involved a fourteen year-old student who was accused of violating a school policy against smoking cigarettes in
the school bathroom. When the student vehemently denied the
accusation, the assistant vite-principal searched her purse. He
found the cigarettes he sought, but continued his quest, eventually finding paraphernalia and records indicating that the stureasonableness; for example, the fact that such inspections "are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, [and) involve a relatively limited
invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." [d. at 537.
This portion of Camara only slightly modified the result reached in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Frank held that a state health inspector need not obtain a
search warrant as a prerequisite to the criminal prosecution of a householder for refusing
to permit the inspector to enter his house. The Court reasoned that the inspection was
only peripherally controlled by the fourth amendment, because the inspector was not
searching for "evidence of criminal action." Thus, the Court held that the householder
did not enjoy the full protection of the fourth amendment.
Frank had also held that a warrant issued after frequent refusals by the householder
to permit the search need only be based upon "reasonableness" and dispensed with the
warrant and probable cause requirements. The distinction between the Camara and
Frank decisions in a petit-criminal context is a separate can of worms, beyond the scope
of this article.
221. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
222. Id.

223. For additional cases involving "administrative" searches, see Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 429 U.S. 1347 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality, under Camara and See,
of a provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) which allowed warrantless entry and inspection of work places for OSHA violations); cf. Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (holding that official entries to investigate the cause of a fire
after the fire had been extinguished did not require a warrant unless such reentries were
"detached from the initial exigency"); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S 287 (1984) ("[I)f
reasonable privacy interests remain in the fire-damaged property, the warrant requirement applies, and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in the absence
of consent or exigent circumstances.").
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dent might be engaged in the sale of marijuana. 224 The Supreme
Court held that, as a public employee, the principal's actions fell
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment, and that students
enjoy certain rights of privacy in the school setting. However, no
warrant was required, nor was "probable cause" of the criminal
sort necessary, for him to conduct his search. Rather, the Court
adopted a liberal balancing test:
[T]he child's interest in privacy must be set
[against] the substantial interest of teachers and
administrators in maintaining discipline in the
classroom and on . school grounds....
[M]aintaining security and order in the schools
requires a degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the value
of preserving the informality of the studentteacher relationship.22G

Thus it might be suggested that the Fourth Amendment's
protections were meant chiefly, although not solely, to protect
persons suspected of criminal activities from being forced by
over-zealous civil authorities to surrender their privacy and possessions by submitting their person or property to a search.
While school officials are indisputably "state actors" and, consequently, technically subject to the Bill of Rights including the
Fourth Amendment, less exacting and rigorous standards apply
when they conduct a search. The distinction between the standards governing search by law enforcement officers, health officials, and those regulating searches by school officials, are justified by the teacher-student relationship and the different
penalties involved. This "student ... is under [the school's] authority and the penalty handed down by a school official is not
criminal in nature."
But what of a situation that arises with increasing frequency; one in which the school official acts in concert with the
police in conducting a search on school grounds? After all,
T.L.O. was not objecting to a school disciplinary proceeding, but
224. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. In the context of criminal law, a "full field strip search"
of the subject is technically legal if the apprehending officer has a sufficient reason to
conduct a search in the first place, even though the search goes well beyond the reason
for the original apprehension.
225. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40.
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to the use of the seized evidence in a delinquency action in Juvenile Court.226 Two cases decided in the late 1960's by a federal
district court in Alabama are particularly instructive on this
point. 227 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to directly address th~
Issue.
The Piazzola and Moore cases both arose from a search of
individual dormitory rooms, in response to a "drug problem"
brought to the attention of Troy State University's Dean by the
Chief of Police of Troy, Alabama. 228 Two state narcotic agents,
accompanied by University officials, searched the rooms of
Gordon Moore and Frank Piazzola "without search warrants and
without their consent," and unearthed incriminating evidence.229
The difference between the two cases lies in the regulation
that was violated, and the punishments sought to be imposed.
Piazzola was arrested and convicted for illegal possession of marijuana,23o while Moore was "indefinitely suspended" from the
schoo1. 231 Each. opinion seems to turn on the "purpose" of the
search; upholding Moore's dismissal and setting aside Piazzola's
conviction.
Because the dormitory search in Piazzola was "instigated
and in the main executed" by the police, the district court believed that the "sole purpose" of the search was to obtain evidence in furtherance of a criminal prosecution. Searches of this
sort are generally held unreasonable unless there is probable
cause and a warrant, consent or exigency.232
226. Id. at 329.
227. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D.
Ala. 1968); Pi82zola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 42 F.2d 284
(5th Cir. 1971).
228. Piazzola, 316 F. Supp. at 625. Information about the alleged "drug problem"
came from "unnamed but reliable informers." Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 728. The use of
informers by police as a source of "probable cause" opens up another can of worms that
is beyond the scope of this article.
229. Piazzola, 316 F. Supp. at 625.
230. Id.
231. Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 727.
232. See, e.g., Picha v. Weilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-21 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding
that the probable cause standard also should apply to searches by school officials in
which the police are involved). However, as a general rule, a "tag along" search (by police) is legal if the primary investigator has a sufficient legal basis for his investigation.
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Moore reached the opposite result, emphasizing the significance of the stated or implied "purpose" of the search. Moore
held that the search was university-initiated, pursuant to a legitimate university mission, namely, to "maintain discipline and
order," and to enforce a "reasonable" campus regulation. Therefore, the "administrative" search neither required criminal probable cause nor a search warrant. The Alabama District Court
was possibly a bit more solicitous of the college student's "privacy" in Moore than was the Supreme Court of the minor il1
T.L.O., but not much. Both situations were viewed as somewhat
"benign" when compared to police searches.

In T.L.O. the Supreme Court held that because of the "substantial interest" teachers and administrators had in student
safety and discipline, their searches could be warrantless and
need not be based on probable cause. "Rather, the legality of a
search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness
under all the circumstances .... "233
"Reasonableness" was to be analyzed in two stages. First,."a
search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be
'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated or is violating either public laws or the rules of the
school."234 This is some "cause," to be sure, but nothing like that
legally required before a police officer can conduct a warrantless
search of a criminal suspect. Both are a type of "ends" test.
Second, the search will be considered "reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place,"2311 only when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."236 This is a type of "means" test. Thus,
the Supreme Court has held merely that the search must be
(and it was) "reasonable" in both its objective (ends) and conduct (means); nothing more.
233.
required
234.
235.
236.

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added); ct. The standard of "reasonableness"
in Camara, supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20 (1968)).
[d.

[d. at 342.
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The standard is surely lower than that applied to police
searches of criminal suspects. And it should be unless we are to
make our schools into armed camps, and teachers into veteran
police.
A student - at any level of schooling - also has a cognizable interest in his or her person and property that school officials
ought to respect and not violate unless there is some clear threat
to the academy. The principal in T.L.O. examined the student's
purse for cigarettes. He had good cause to do so, for she was
accused of violating a school rule regarding smoking. But the
facts of the case suggest that T.L.O. was not evidently "guilty"
of any criminal statute, until an involuntary search of her purse
went further and produced evidence that she might be engaged
in drug dealing. The best reason to allow this deeper, more intrusive search might be (and was according to the case dicta)
that the school official plays a custodial role, and is interested
solely in protecting this student or other students. However, one
must remember that it is exactly this type of deference to discretionary state "authority" that lies at the root of the Fourth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court expressly left open the question
whether a school official (here, an assistant vice principal) could
surpass his role as school disciplinarian and hand over the evidence he found to public prosecutors, if police officers could not
have conducted the same search without violating the Fourth
Amendment. 237 This is the issue judiciously resolved by lower
237. The Supreme Court has upheld the right to use evidence discovered in a private search to procure a criminal conviction. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109
(1984); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). However, in these cases, the
"private" discovery of contraband was not assisted or induced in any way by public authority. Although it is true that "every man" - even a private citizen - must give his
evidence (with narrow exceptions) at least to grand juries, that is not to say that private
actors are untainted when they collaborate with public authorities. Moreover, the investigating authority in T.L.O., Moore and Piazzola was a public official, to whom the
fourth amendment applies. Thus, the real differences among these cases would appear to
be whether police authority induces and/or collaborates in the search, and whether the
evidence is used for internal, disciplinary purposes, or for criminal prosecutions. Educators have no generalized responsibility to enforce the law, except for situations in which
schools are assigned some specific monitoring function by statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1982); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1088-1099 (1982). But even these
circumstances rarely involve responsibility for enforcing public criminal laws. However,
the possessor of knowledge of criminal conduct could himself be prosecuted as an "accessory after the fact" if he refuses to divulge to enforcement officials the evidence he has.
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courts in Piazzola and Moore, but virtually ignored, and left unanswered, in T.L.O.
Also left unanswered by the T.L.O. Court was the question
whether a student has a legitimate "expectation of privacy" in
his or her locker, desk, or other school property provided the
student for storage. 23S Such areas are often searched, and school
administrators can justly claim that lockers and dormitory
rooms are school property, merely let to students for their use.
This ignores the traditional privacy rights of lessees under the
law, which may be surrendered only in reasonable ways and for
cause. 23e Why should students be treated differently?
The Fourth Amendment's guarantees are not so narrowlyframed. Theoretically they protect all citizens (including students) from the unwarranted prying of public officials (including
teachers, principals and deans). Any "search or seizure" of a
purse, locker, or dormitory room, without an adequate pretext
238. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338, n.5. Ct. Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (lOth Cir.
1981) (holding that the school had a right to inspect a student's locker by virtue of having joint control over it); People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366 (1969) (holding that school
administrators have the power to consent to a police search of a student's locker). But
see State v. Engerud, 463 A.2d 934, 943 (1983) (holding that students have an expectation of privacy in the contents of their lockers as a "home away from home ... where the
student stores the kind of personal 'effects' protected by the Fourth Amendment.")
Engerud was joined with T.L.O. in the New Jersey court, where both searches were
found to violate the fourth amendment. The T.L.O. decision, however, did not mention
Engerud except to disclaim any position on locker searches. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 n.5.
See also Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (w.n. Mich. 1975) (holding that college
students had the same interest in the privacy of their dormitory rooms as any adult
would have in their home, dwelling or lodging, under the fourth amendment). Neither
was the Smyth court willing to enforce the "blanket authorization" to search, contained
in the school's rental contract for dormitory rooms, at least when adult students were
accused of acts that were also criminal. And why should public school lockers or desks be
viewed more favorably than the item searched in T.L.O.: her own purse?
239. In the classic case, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), a landlord
could not consent to the search of rented premises in the absence of the tenant. Accord,
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), involving a city housing inspector's
warrantless attempt to search a leased ground floor apartment. Of particular interest is a
California - not a U.S. Supreme Court - case (although it interpreted the fourth
amendment) that held that a parent could not consent to a police search of his minor
son's locked toolbox, and that the ensuing, warrantless search violated the minor's constitutional rights. In re Scott K. 595 P.2d 105 (1979); but cf. Moore v. Troy State, 284 F.
Supp. 725, 731 (1968): "a student who lives in a [campus] dormitory ... which he 'rents'
from the school waives objection to any reasonable searches conducted pursuant to reasonable ... [school] regulations." Thus, a renter from the school may be treated differently from other lessees; and a disciplinary search may differ from one by police, enforcing the criminal law.
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ought to be forbidden. The notion that school officials act in
parens patriae; that is, that they occupy a parent's position with
respect to their child's (student's) person or possessions, does
not really wash. 240 Parents and their children are frequently confrontational, but parents' prerogatives are protected by domestic
relations law. Not so the school official. He or she may have the
most paternal of motives, but just as frequently may act as a
surrogate for civil authority when investigating a student.
What should we make of the difference in the outcomes of
Moore and Piazzola, as applied to the circumstances of T.L.O.?
It is an oft-cited notion that school officials serve as role models,
mentors and confidants, acting in the individual student's best
interests or those of the entire school.
This view would make more sense if discipline was confined
to the school environment or, in extreme cases, suspension or
expulsion was used to either admonish or protect other students.
In those circumstances, the school official is more constructive
and less confrontational than a police officer apprehending a
criminal suspect, and the ensuing school process and punishment is more remedial than punitive. However, when a school
official passes the fruits of his search to prosecution authorities,
or collaborates with them in conducting a search, he serves not
in an educator's role, but as an "agent" of the police. At this
point, any "benign" motive the official or academy may have
evaporated, and the search (or consequence thereof) is converted
into the type the Fourth Amendment was meant to regulate. 241
These "unaddressed" questions in T.L.O. suggest other
chinks in the armor of Tinker. The T.L.O. outcome was not unexpected, however, for the general retreat from Constitutional
protections for students that this article documents was paralleled by a similar withdrawal of protections for the criminally
.
accused. 242
240. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336; In re Scott K., 595 P.2d. 105 (1979).
241. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342, n.7. The Supreme Court limits its conclusions to
"searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their authority," although
the evidence found could be given to prosecutors and not suppressed. Hence, the Court
in T.L.O. purports not to address the issue presented inPiazzola, namely "the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement officers." Id. (emphasis added).
242. E.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding if "probable cause"
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I agree that school children are not adults, and that, in the
academy, they sacrifice certain rights of autonomy. But there
ought to be some satisfactory "predicate" in order to search and
discipline them. For example, if there was a: serious drug or violence problem at the school, and notice was given that all purses
and bags would be searched, and metal-detectors were to be
used at school entrances. This could be justified by the circumstances, without warrants or individualized suspicion, and without violating the Fourth Amendment. 243
CONCLUSION
The point I seek to make here is that students in general,
and especially minor students, do not remotely enjoy the freedoms that Tinker seemed to confer on them in 1969. Far from
enjoying all the civil rights that do not "materially and substantially interfere" with the school's academic mission and need for
order, students appear to enjoy only those rights that school officials elect to accord them. The Supreme Court's position has
evolved (actually, devolved) so much since 1969 that Tinker has
been rendered nearly obsolete, although never explicitly
overruled.
Times have certainly changed since Mary Beth Tinker esjustifies the search of a lawfully-stopped vehicle, it allows a warrantless search of every
part of the vehicle that a magistrate could authorize by warrant, including areas "not in
plain view"); Segura v. United States 468 U.S. 796 (1985) (holding that a non-consensual
search that discovered drug paraphernalia "in plain view" was not invalid because of
"administrative delay" in the issuance of a search warrant. The "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine can be overcome by an "independent source" for the discovery of the
evidence); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the accused is not de- '
prived of fair trial and effective assistance of counsel if the latter simply refuses to abet
the accused in his perjury).
243. As nearly as the facts reveal, neither situation obtained in TL,O., although the
school apparently had decided that smoking, at least in certain areas, should be
punished.
The BROCKTON ENTERPRISE, (Massachusetts), on March 14, 1992, reported that police secretly installed hidden videotape cameras in a New Ipswich, N.H. high school boys
room, with the principal's permission. The purpose was allegedly to eavesdrop on drug
transactions, drug use and vandalism. The need for the cameras was not documented,
although the local police chief said that it did lead to arrests. Neither the students, superintendent nor the school board were informed. Was there an adequate predicate for
this intrusion into school privacy? How will students attending the school relate to
school leadership in the future? Is the harm done likely to outweigh the good
accomplished?
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tablished her right to wear a black armband to school. Times
changed, and with them the law.
if Tinker offered unprecedented, and perhaps unworkable,
protections for students, today's school officials appear to have
been given too much authority to regulate the behavior of public
primary and secondary school pupils. It is almost as if Justice
Black's dissenting view in Tinker (that "children should be seen
and not heard") has become the law of the land. All this without
Tinker being reversed, or even cited unfavorably.244
Does it not seem that the best answer to this inevitable ebb
and flow of Constitutional interpretation - favoring first students and then teachers and schools - lies between the extreme
positions taken first in Tinker and later in Hazelwood and
Bethel School? While it seems quite evident that schools cannot
effectively pursue their mission if forced to operate at the
threshold of "material and substantial disruption," neither
ought students to be cast once again as "closed circuit recipients" of what the school chooses to offer. Admittedly, schools
have grown more tense and violent, but the Tinker formula allows school officials to take appropriate precautionary steps and
disciplinary action when it is justified. The administrative actions in T.L.O., Bethel School and Hazelwood, however, evidence as much desire to assert authority and avoid public embarrassment and friction, as they do to regulate schools for
educational or safety reasons. Students are neither deceived nor
educated by such heavy-handed regulations, and the isolation
they create ill-prepares students for the prudent judgments they
will eventually have to make in the public "marketplace."
I have never understood why schools did not attempt to
turn various threats to their educational mission into "learning
experiences" for students, the better to teach them in the academic "marketplace" about the collision of opinions and values
that occur in the public marketplace, beyond the school and its
control. In reality, these collisions are numerous and often violent. Choosing the right course can have enormous personal and
societal import, but there will be no teacher to point the way; far
244. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), both majority and dissenting
opinions cited Tinker as binding precedent.
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less to dictate it. Whether our school-educated citizenry makes a
good choice in these situations depends much more upon
whether teachers have inculcated in their students values of
judgment and restraint, than whether the day has gone smoothly
and the mathematics lesson was completed.
If the power to control student behavior is exercised to suppress student initiative, which is invariably probing and often
intentionally provocative, and not to prepare students for a public marketplace that offers many options and knows few restraints, then Mary Beth will have had reason indeed to wear a
black arm band.
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